Over the past several decades, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’ annulment procedure has proved an object of consternation for states and investors alike. The substantive principles of Article 52 of the ICSID Convention are commonly criticized as either too expansive or too narrow. The author contends that this criticism is misplaced, however, and that it is procedural deficiencies which will plague ICSID’s annulment proceedings in this time of broad investor-state dispute reform. Overconcentration of annulment committee appointment and challenge power in the hands of the Chairman of the ICSID Committee and ICSID Secretariat, compounded by continued problems of ‘double-hatting’ at the annulment level, threaten the due process rights and autonomy of parties to ICSID annulments. The author proposes a feasible restructuring of annulment appointment and challenge procedure under the ICSID Arbitration Rules as a potential rectification of these procedural flaws, including a dispersal of appointment power, a new pool system for annulment panel members, and the creation of an independent review body to consider challenges to annulment panel members.