Weighing Global Regulatory Rules and Decisions in National Courts

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I INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Global regulatory governance is increasingly conducted by extra-national institutions adopting administrative-style rules and regulations, or specific decisions concerning individual entities, which affect private actors or state agencies in ways that eventually come to be considered in national courts. This global regulatory governance produces unfamiliar challenges for national courts. Traditional analysis of 'international law in national courts' is germane, but does not reach many of the current generation of legal problems. This paper assesses some existing conceptual resources for dealing with these problems, and proposes a distinctive normative approach to a particular set of hard cases based on evaluation by the national court of the extent to which a particular rule or decision of the global regulatory institution satisfies criteria of 'publicness'.

This introductory section presents the arguments that the diverse actors in global regulatory governance interact in a 'global administrative space', and that rules and decisions of, and relations among, these regulatory actors are increasingly shaped by an emerging body of global administrative law. The remaining sections of this paper consider the roles national courts play in relation to global regulatory governance, and the implications for national courts of the emerging global administrative law. Section II puts forward a basic four-fold typology of global regulatory institutions, and provides illustrative examples of national courts grappling with global regulatory rules and decisions produced by institutions of each type. Section III surveys some of the established doctrinal approaches taken by national courts in determining whether and how to give effect to rules and decisions of extra-national institutions in contexts of global regulatory governance, where the external act is neither a treaty nor a foreign state's law, nor a court decision. Section IV turns to a major normative problem: how should a national court appraise such a regula-

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tory governance decision or administrative rule adopted by an external institution? This latter issue is only just coming to be clearly delineated. As such, there is no standard line of analysis of the problem among national courts. However, this paper suggests the possibility of a standardised approach that can be informed by concepts and ideas from global administrative law.

Instead of neatly separated levels of regulation (private, local, national, inter-state), a congeries of different actors and different layers together form a variegated ‘global administrative space’ that includes international institutions and transnational networks, as well as domestic administrative bodies that operate within international regimes or cause transboundary regulatory effects.1 The idea of a ‘global administrative space’ marks a departure from orthodox understandings of international law, in which the international is largely inter-governmental, and there is a strict separation of the domestic and the international. In the world of global governance, transnational networks of rule-generators and interpreters cause such strict barriers to break down. This new space is increasingly occupied by private regulators and hybrid bodies, in addition to the traditional international institutions and organisations, such as those of the United Nations. A lot of the administration of global governance is highly decentralised and not very systematic. National courts can thus find themselves as actors in global regulatory governance, reviewing the acts of international, transnational and especially national bodies that are in effect, administering global governance systems. In some cases the national courts themselves form part of the practical administration and administrative review of a global governance regime. This reality is unavoidable, even though it is not, of course, necessarily the way in which national judges wish to view themselves or their responsibilities. This paper seeks to show how the emerging concept of global administrative law, which is animated in part by the idea that much of global governance can usefully be analysed as administration, may provide ways for national courts to structure their inescapable engagements with these challenging issues.

Global administrative law is not a new idea, but it has taken on new meanings and significance.2 One approach understands global administrative law as the legal mechanisms, principles and practices, along with

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2 NYU Law School Institute for International Law and Justice’s research project on Global Administrative Law has a website, including a series of working papers and extensive bibliographies, as well as links to papers from other scholars around the world: www.iilj.org. Sets of papers from the first phase of this project appear in three journal symposia: (2005) 68 Law & Contemporary Problems; (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law; (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law & Policy.
supporting social understandings, that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring these bodies meet adequate standards of transparency, consultation, participation, rationality and legality, and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions these bodies make.\(^3\) This is described as ‘global’ rather than ‘international’ to avoid implying that this is all part of the lex lata, and instead to include informal institutional arrangements (many involving prominent roles for non-state actors) and other normative practices and sources that are not encompassed within standard conceptions of ‘international law’. In some respects, global administrative law is in tension with the classical model of consent-based international law,\(^4\) but it is nonetheless capable of producing norms to which national courts must increasingly be alert. Traditional international law rules are highly relevant, but provide insufficient guidance to national courts in this new and uncharted territory. As this paper will show, national courts have variously sought to evaluate global governance norms by reference to standards defined as jus cogens, customary international law, general international law or ‘general principles of law’, but these have not fully resolved problems for courts in determining what the proper sources are of the rules to be applied, or indeed what the forum court’s role is in a particular governance regime.

Global administrative law is emerging as the evolving regulatory structures are each confronted with demands for transparency, consultation, participation, reasoned decisions and review mechanisms to promote accountability. These demands, and responses to them, are increasingly framed in terms that have a common normative character, specifically an administrative law character. The growing commonality of these administrative law-type principles and practices is building a unity between otherwise disparate areas of governance. The sense that there is some unity of proper principles and practices across these areas is of growing importance to the strengthening, or eroding, of legitimacy and effectiveness in these different governance regimes.

Global administrative law is practised at multiple sites, with some hierarchy of norms and authority, and some inter-site precedent and borrowing of principles, but with considerable contextual variation. It is influenced by treaties and fundamental customary international law rules, but it goes much beyond these sources and sometimes moves away from them. Its shared sets of norms and practices are in some cases regarded as obligatory. But they are also meshed with other sources of obligation.


applicable to that site—sources which may include the national law of the place, the constituent instrument and regulations of the norm-applying institution, contracts establishing private rights, or norms of general international law. It is in this challenging context that national courts are called upon to operate.

II TYPOLOGY OF GLOBAL REGULATORY GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS WHOSE RULES AND DECISIONS ARE CONSIDERED BY NATIONAL COURTS

The administrative dimensions of global regulatory governance, and the involvement of national courts in these processes, vary widely. This section presents a four-fold typology of extra-national regulatory governance institutions, and provides illustrative examples of the engagement of national courts with each type of institution.

The spectrum of transnational/global governance regimes in respect of which a national court may have to determine the weight to give to assorted rules, decisions and policies of external bodies is very wide and highly variegated. The regimes may be differentiated according to the types of issues they deal with (security, global markets, moral and human rights issues, and so on) and according to the degree of coherence and agreement on the policies and standards within the particular regime. For a national court it will often be important to consider whether the forum state is a member of the organisation; whether the government or a leading national body is an active participant; what the attitude of the national legislature seems to have been to the organisation (for example, whether it has regularly utilised or endorsed the organisation’s standards); and whether a particular role (broad or limited) for national courts in relation to this governance regime seems to be envisaged within the regime or in national legislation. Scholarship on global administrative law has differentiated global regulatory governance regimes according to the actors and organisational form involved, using a four-fold typology with regard to actors other than national governments and their agencies.

First are formal intergovernmental organisations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The International Civil Aviation Organization hosts the Chicago Convention regime for civil aviation, which is coherent and has relatively clear policies and standards, even if there is decentralised administration and scope for variation in approaches to particular subjects. The Chicago Convention regime is still primarily an intergovernmental regime operationalised through national government agencies, even while private entities such as the airline industry association (the International Air Transport Association) play a significant role. National courts frequently engage with ICAO rules and decisions, often in the exercise of their functions in national administrative law in relation to relevant actions of national agencies. An illustrative
example is the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s 1997 decision in the *Air Line Pilots’ Association* case. In rejecting a complaint by the Air Line Pilots’ Association that certain disclosures from the cockpit voice recorders of a crashed aeroplane would be inconsistent with the Annex on Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944,\(^5\) the judges of the New Zealand Court of Appeal were, in effect, dealing with, and participating in, a form of global regulatory governance.\(^6\) A state party can elect to depart from, or not to apply in domestic law, the Standards and Recommended Practices that appear in Annexes to the Chicago Convention and are revised regularly. However, the actual practical operation of the different Standards and Recommended Practices does not follow the uniform system that determines their formal legal status, but varies depending on the topic and phrasing of the particular Standard or Recommended Practice, and on market or bilateral pressures such as the threat of exclusion from United States airspace for non-compliance with some provisions.\(^7\)

The approach taken the Court of Appeal has led *Air Line Pilots’ Association* typically to be classified as a decision on ‘international treaties in national law’. To be sure, it is rightly regarded as a robust and sophisticated example in this category: the Court’s careful handling of clause 5.12 of Annex 13 on cockpit voice recordings included fine-grained distinctions between this and other Standards and Recommended Practices, as well as close analysis of the relevant New Zealand legislation.

The case can also be seen in a slightly different way, as one of many situations where a national court determines how it will appraise, and what weight it will give to, a governance decision or administrative rule adopted by an external institution. It is of course important to consider the status in international law of the relevant rule or decision, and the effect given to this category of rule or decision in the national law of the forum. But inquiry may also be needed into other questions: what formal authority and status the rule or decision has in the system within which it was made; how it was made (issues of process); how the governance regime actually works and how it is understood by its main participants or constituencies; how this aligns with the public policy of the forum, and perhaps with broader public and governmental interests; and what role could properly and usefully be played by the national court. The national court has responsibilities to its national public and to the State for its

\(^5\) Convention on International Civil Aviation (7 December 1944) 15 UNTS 295.
\(^6\) *New Zealand Air Line Pilots’ Association v Attorney-General* [1997] 3 NZLR 269 (CA).
\(^7\) For example, Standards and Recommended Practices relating to medical certification of aircrew, which New Zealand decided to depart from in a modest way in relation to certain older crew members until the United States Federal Aviation Administration indicated that New Zealand-registered aircraft risked being unable to operate in the United States. My thanks to Stephanie Winson-Rota of the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand for this example.
exercise of power; but the court may also have a functional if unarticulated role in the relevant global governance regime, and may even have responsibilities to others involved in that regime or affected by it who are not parties to the particular case. Operationalising this broader contextual view of the governance of the issue can be very difficult: how can the court be confident that it is well-informed on those broader issues, what are the sources of norms to be applied within such a governance system, and in any case to what extent if at all should these governance considerations displace the outcome that would result from application of the formal law of the forum (including international law where the forum's law provides for that)?

It may be thought that the problems in operationalising this broader ‘governance’ approach mean it should not be pursued. In my view, these problems must be faced no matter what framing is used. Thus, although it certainly does not use the language of governance, we can see the Court of Appeal in *Air Line Pilots’ Association* grappling with some of these questions – trying to determine how the Chicago Convention system of global governance works, and what weight different elements of it should have for a New Zealand court if the formal status of these elements has not already been precisely worked out in New Zealand law, as well as what the consequences might be if the New Zealand courts act in a particular way. New Zealand has long been a party to the relevant treaties and an active participant in the regime, much of which has been incorporated into national legislation. Thus the context for the involvement of New Zealand courts in *Air Line Pilots’ Association* was reasonably straightforward. Other global governance regimes pose more challenging problems in these respects.

A second category of global administrative structures is the intergovernmental networks of state officials, some of which work completely outside treaty structures, while others use network forms but also administer treaties. The many different kinds of networks of state officials (and sometimes of industry representatives or other private actors) in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are illustrative.

In 2008, the House of Lords, in determining the legality of the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office's decision to halt the investigations into allegations of bribery by BAE Systems to procure military aircraft contracts with Saudi Arabia (the halt being due to political concerns concerning United Kingdom-Saudi relations), was asked to consider the meaning and implications of Article 5 of the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business...
Transactions, an international treaty to which the United Kingdom is party and on which United Kingdom criminal legislation is partly based. The treaty had not otherwise been given formal effect in United Kingdom legislative instruments, but avoiding a violation of it had been one major consideration in the decisions taken by the Attorney–General and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office. They had decided that taking account of United Kingdom national security and Middle East foreign policy interests was proper under Article 5 even though the impairments of these interests all resulted from the threat to United Kingdom–Saudi relations allegedly issued by Saudi representatives as a response to the bribery investigations. The House of Lords, finding that it could resolve the case on other grounds, decided not to make its own interpretation of Article 5 on the basis that this internationally unresolved issue was better left to the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery, which considers specific cases under the Convention including the allegations relating to these aircraft contracts.

The House of Lords’ reasons for leaving this to future deliberations of the Working Group on Bribery were not that the Working Group on Bribery has exclusive competence in Convention matters, or anything to do with lis pendens. Rather, the House of Lords reasoned that uniformity of interpretation of Article 5 was highly desirable, all the more so given the difficulty of some of the interpretive issues involved, and the concomitant hazards of unilateral interpretation by national courts. It was preferable, the Law Lords suggested, to try to achieve agreement on this

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8 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (21 November 1997) 37 ILM 1, art 5: 'Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public official shall be subject to the applicable rules and principles of each Party. They shall not be influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved.'

9 R (Corner House Research and Campaign Against the Arms Trade) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, reversing the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court decision [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin).

10 Ibid paras 44–46 (per Lord Bingham) and 65–66 (per Lord Brown).

11 Ibid paras 44–46 (per Lord Bingham) and 65–66 (per Lord Brown). The Divisional Court had made a further argument that uniformity is almost essential to the Convention succeeding as an anti-bribery instrument: ‘Self-interest is bound to have the tendency to defeat the eradication of international bribery. The Convention is deprived of effect unless competitors are prepared to adopt the same discipline. The state which condones bribery in its economic or diplomatic self-interest will merely step into the commercial shoes of the states which honour their commitment. Unless a uniform distinction is drawn between the potential effect upon relations with another state and national security, some signatories of the Convention will be able to escape its discipline by relying upon a broad definition of national security, thus depriving the prohibited consideration of the effect upon relations with another state of any force’ (at para 142, per Moses LJ for the Court).
difficult issue through the Working Group on Bribery, which was the method stipulated in the Convention.\textsuperscript{12}

The third group comprises hybrid public-private governance or regulatory arrangements. These include mutual recognition arrangements where a private agency in one country tests products to certify compliance with governmental standards of another country, as well as more prominent organisational arrangements in which governments and private actors interact to promulgate and give effect to standards. A defendant to a negligence action might argue, for example, that a product complied with a standard of the International Standards Organization, a major norm-generating entity that is largely private.\textsuperscript{13} Courts in the United States have frequently considered the relation between private standard-setting and national regulation of competition through antitrust laws, as for example in a telecommunications case where it is alleged that a company’s patented technology was incorporated by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute and other standard-setting bodies into the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System standard for cellphones, but that the company then failed to honour a commitment that the European Telecommunications Standards Institute had required of it to license this technology to others on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.\textsuperscript{14} The International Standards Organization and its member organisations began to come in for potential judicial scrutiny in relation to the adoption, in March 2008, of a standard for Office Open XML, a Microsoft-inspired standard strongly opposed by some advocates of open-source software.\textsuperscript{15}

Fourth are structures of private global regulatory governance. Many areas of global governance are, in practice, dominated by non-state entities and interests (such as self-regulatory industry associations) and cooperative private-private regulatory arrangements (such as business-NGO partnerships for garment and shoe manufacture in the Fair Labor Association). National courts are increasingly called upon to weigh rules

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid paras 45 and 46 (per Lord Bingham). The Divisional Court had also emphasised the absence of a definitive ruling from the Working Group on Bribery: ‘Faced with the WGB’s apparent endorsement of the domestic rules and principles of prosecutions in the UK, Canada and Germany and absent any further ruling of the WGB, we express no concluded view as to whether it was open to the Director to take the view that his decision was in compliance with Article 5’ (at para 157, per Moses LJ for the Court).


\textsuperscript{14} One of several decisions in that case is Broadcom v Qualcomm (2007) 501 F 3d 297 (3d Cir).

\textsuperscript{15} The United Kingdom Unix User Group stated that in June 2008 Lloyd Jones J had ruled against their application in the English High Court challenging the British Standards Institute’s decision to vote in favour of this standard in the International Standards Organization, and indicated their intention to appeal. Press Release of 19 June 2008, available at www.ukuug.org/ooxml (accessed 27 August 2008).
and decisions taken by such private bodies where there may have been no specific state or inter-state regulatory action at all. For example, the New Zealand Human Rights Review Tribunal in 2005 had to determine what weight to give to international airline industry standards in deciding whether an airline would commit unlawful discrimination by requiring a specified payment for advance provision of extra oxygen for customers who indicate they will require it on a flight.\textsuperscript{16} It is easy to imagine contract disputes where a court would have to decide what weight to give to detailed sets of criteria for sustainable forest use developed by the Forest Stewardship Council, a transnational private body, or to a certificate of products under such criteria.\textsuperscript{17}

One US case on the role of national courts is particularly illustrative. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), an organ of private governance constituted as a non-profit California corporation (albeit ICANN and its work are increasingly influenced by governments), adopted a Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) under which Administrative Panels resolve domain names disputes applying primarily ICANN’s rules on this topic. The UDRP expressly preserves the possibility for parties to go to national courts having jurisdiction in relation to the particular dispute. The UDRP was applicable to the second-level domain ‘Barcelona.com’, registered to a US corporation Bcom, because Bcom’s contract with the internet service provider so stipulated (and indeed was required by ICANN so to stipulate). The municipal government of Barcelona won the case it brought before an administrative panel convened by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an inter-governmental organisation but here acting as an approved provider of dispute resolution under the UDRP. The US trial court gave the WIPO panel decision no legal weight, but nevertheless ‘proceeded in essence to apply the WIPO panelist’s opinion’.\textsuperscript{18} The Court of Appeals emphasised that under the controlling US statute a US court should decide the case de novo and accord no deference at all to the WIPO administrative panel, in contrast for example to the deference US courts accord to certain kinds of arbitral awards. The court gave reasons for this from both a US and an ICANN standpoint. It noted that ‘because a UDRP decision is susceptible of being grounded on principles foreign or hostile to American law, the ACPA [the US legislation] authorizes reversing a panel decision if such a result is called for by application of the Lanham Act’. But the court explained that this is what ICANN intended.

\textsuperscript{16} Smith v Air New Zealand Ltd (2005) 8 HRNZ 86.
\textsuperscript{18} This is the characterisation of the District Court’s opinion, given by the Court of Appeals, in Barcelona.com v Excelentíssimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona (2003) 330 F.3d 617 (4th Cir).
in designing the UDRP as a quick process utilising any rules and principles of law the panel deems applicable:

Because the administrative process prescribed by the UDRP is ‘adjudication lite’ as a result of its streamlined nature and its loose rules regarding applicable law, the UDRP itself contemplates judicial intervention, which can occur before, during, or after the UDRP’s dispute-resolution process is invoked . . .

As ICANN recognized in designing the UDRP, allowing recourse to full-blown adjudication under a particular nation’s law is necessary to prevent abuse of the UDRP process [specifically, reverse domain name hijacking].19

III ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES FOR APPRAISING EXTERNAL RULES AND DECISIONS

The simple typology of global regulatory governance institutions presented in the previous section provides only one very rudimentary element in organising the complex set of cases in which the rules and decisions of such institutions come to be considered in national courts. This section provides another modest organisational element, by surveying some of the concepts and categories used by national courts in appraising and determining what weight to give to governance decisions or administrative rules adopted by external regulatory institutions.

The range of such cases in national courts is vast. The law of the forum may incorporate, or give effect to, some external norm. More difficult are situations where the forum state has delegated continuing powers to make rules and decisions to a non-adjudicative external entity, which are then given effect to automatically in the forum state’s law. Such situations of dynamic incorporation of externally-altered norms, or of external administrative decisions, raise difficult problems in many polities. They may be justified where the expertise of the external actor is incomparably greater, or where failure to go along with the external actor’s decisions would be too costly in economic or political terms, and the expense of repeatedly incorporating each separate rule or decision on a static basis is too high and prone to error. But such delegation comes at a high cost in democratic deliberative law-making, and is not permitted in some constitutional systems.20

National courts may seek a middle ground on deference to an external entity. Thus a national court might accept that the states members of the United Nations have delegated certain powers to the UN Security Council and decide to attach decisive weight to a UN Security Council action without further inquiry, but not where the Security Council’s act is

retail rather than wholesale, affecting named individuals in a dispropor-
tionate and arbitrary way and without reasons being given or recourse
being available. At the other end of the spectrum, a national court might
decide that national law simply precludes giving any weight, or even any
validity, to particular kinds of external regulatory norms or decisions. In
any event, the national court’s review function will seldom be a direct
assertion of jurisdiction over the external regulatory body (although such
cases do occur). Such bodies typically have immunity if intergovernmen-
tal, or may fall outside the jurisdiction of the national court, and rules
concerning standing further limit such cases. Rather, the review function
is typically collateral, usually to a case grounded in national law, or to
enforcement or anti-enforcement proceedings. The specific national
substantive and procedural rules structuring the case may thus be of
determinative importance.

In most situations, the law of the forum provides the starting point for
the national court. This is the baseline, almost axiomatic, to which the
discussion will return at the end of this section. In many cases, however,
national courts have also used other legal doctrines. Public international
law purports to provide some trumping rules – a national court might
decide, for example, to give no effect to an action of an external entity
that violates jus cogens. The entity’s action might also be evaluated by
reference to the entity’s own constitution or a controlling treaty, for
example, to determine whether the body acted intra vires (or to deter-
mine who has the power to make such a determination). Customary
international law, or general principles of international law, can also be
used to provide norms for assessing the decision or rule of an external
body. If the decision were that of a foreign state’s court, the national court
might treat this as a question of recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, or res judicata, or perhaps comity. If what was involved was a
foreign state’s legal rule, the question would be one of applicable law and
conflict of laws. Examples will be given of national courts taking such
approaches. In some cases these approaches enable neat disposition of the
issue. In others, however, the realities of contemporary global governance
do not fit neatly into these traditional categories.

Reading these cases, many of which were decisions of first impression,
it is clear that the judges struggled with challenging problems for which
no comprehensive theoretical apparatus was available: what are the
proper sources of rules to be applied; how should the relevant governance
regime and the forum court’s role within it be understood; should the
forum court review the procedural elements or indeed the substantive
content of the external decision, and if so by reference to what rules or
criteria? These are the kinds of questions a global administrative law
approach may help courts address.
(1) The ‘forum law/forum institution’s action’ basis of review

The conclusion that, absent clear statutory or higher authority, a court cannot review the action of an institution not part of the legal system of the forum court has a long pedigree. In *Hirota v MacArthur*, for example, the majority of the United States Supreme Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to consider a habeas corpus petition by persons who had been convicted by the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. The grounds were that this tribunal had ‘been set up by General MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers’, so this ‘was not a tribunal of the United States’. This case dramatises the obvious problems of such a self-denying approach, that in the present situation of global governance there might then be no suitable review tribunal at all, and that a strong incentive is created for a state wishing to escape national rule of law controls to instead arrange for measures to be taken by an international institution that it helps establish, or indeed by another state or private entity.

The dynamics of such a distinction can be discerned in the first few European Union Court of First Instance cases on anti-terrorism sanctions against individuals and organisations. Whereas in *Kadi* and similar cases, the Court of First Instance did not annul the European Community’s (EC’s) implementation of sanctions against persons listed by the UN Security Council (these cases will be discussed below, in the context of the European Court of Justice’s annulment decision), its approach was bolder when applying the direct ‘law of the forum’ to the listing of certain organisations under the EC’s own procedure for anti-terrorism listing of additional persons, entities and groups not listed by the UN Security Council. In December 2006 the Court of First Instance annulled such a listing, finding that:

> [T]he contested decision does not contain a sufficient statement of reasons and that it was adopted in the course of a procedure during which the applicant’s right to a fair hearing was not observed. Furthermore, the Court is not, even at this stage of the procedure, in a position to review the lawfulness of that decision.22

The United States District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in some respects faced no such problem in its important decision in August 2006 in a case brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council challenging a rule adopted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.23 The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the

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Environmental Protection Agency’s rule on critical use exemptions from the restrictions on methyl bromide, on the ground that it did not comply with an administrative decision of the Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol concerning methyl bromide. Thus the Court was able to review the Environmental Protection Agency’s implementing (or non-implementing) action. The United States Clean Air Act stated that the Environmental Protection Agency may exempt critical uses ‘[t]o the extent consistent with the Montreal Protocol’.24 The Montreal Protocol prohibits the production or consumption of methyl bromide except ‘to the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be critical uses.’ The Court’s holding could be read as a narrow one — that this Meeting of the Parties decision was not ‘the Montreal Protocol’ for the purposes of the controlling United States statute, and hence provides no basis for a challenge in a United States court to the Environmental Protection Agency’s rule. Formally, the Court might be thought to confine its review to the actions of a United States agency, judged simply against standards defined in a United States statute. However, some of the Court’s remarks are broader. The Court asserts that the ‘Parties’ post-ratification actions suggest their common understanding that the decisions are international political commitments . . . to be enforceable as a political matter at the negotiation table.’ It is undoubtedly true that these are political commitments, but the Court does not address (nor even mention) the question whether they are also international legal commitments. Instead, it asserts that the parties did not intend these decisions to be judicially enforceable domestic law. No direct evidence for this view of the parties’ intentions is offered. The Court switches to an assertion about United States legal process:

Without congressional action, however, side agreements reached after a treaty has been ratified are not the law of the land; they are enforceable not through the federal courts, but through international negotiations.25

This may be simply a statement that where a treaty is self-executing and is given effect in United States courts under the supremacy clause, a decision taken within that treaty’s subsequent process is not self-executing (at least where the treaty depended on approval by the Senate or by the House and Senate). More likely, however, it reflects an anxiety about ex ante delegation of law-making power to an international body. This anxiety would apply not simply to Meeting of the Parties decisions, as to which it was not clear what the intention of Congress might have been,

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24 Clean Air Act 42 USC § 7401, § 7671.
25 Natural Resources Defense Council v Environmental Protection Agency (n 23) 10, per Randolph J.
but to all changes in the treaty rules unless and until incorporated by Congress ex post into legislation. Thus the Court’s concern would apply to ‘adjustments’ to the Protocol, which Congress purported to approve as the legal standard in advance (in the Clean Air Act). On this reading, the Court is concerned with how United States law is made, and thus against what rules a United States agency may be reviewed by a United States court. It does not purport to review the acts of the Meeting of the Parties, nor to decide on the status under international law of their actions (although this reading would admittedly be more compelling had the Court noted, as it perhaps should have done, that its remarks about the Meeting of the Parties decision being only a political commitment did not imply a view of the international legal status of those decisions).

The review by the British Columbia Supreme Court of the arbitral award in The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation, initiated by Mexico because British Columbia was the place of arbitration, also focuses initially on the application of the relevant national law, in this case the relevant British Columbian statute, the International Commercial Arbitration Act. The Court treated this statute as establishing not only the Court’s powers and responsibilities, but also the scope and standard of review. It refrained from utilising an emerging jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada in what might be called the common law of administrative review, which applies a ‘pragmatic and functional’ approach. The British Columbian Court then engaged directly in the interpretation of NAFTA, holding that the arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of ‘international law’ in NAFTA Article 1105 went beyond the established meaning of ‘international law’ without an adequate basis to do so, and wrongly imported into NAFTA chapter 11 an obligation of transparency, thus exceeding the scope of the submission to arbitration. In crossing into international law, the British Columbian Court did not shift explicitly into a different interpretive mode. In other situations, national courts have endeavoured to use a different hermeneutics when interpreting various kinds of international law instruments or even other transnational legal materials. Other possible approaches to the rules and decisions of global regulatory governance institutions are considered in the remainder of this section.

(2) Jus cogens

The possible role of jus cogens has been an issue in challenges by individuals arising from their designation as persons whose assets should be frozen under national (or EC) measures implementing United Nations Security Council (UN Security Council) sanctions against specified persons sus-

26 The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corporation (2001) BCSC 664.
pected of financing terrorist activities. The source of these cases was the increase in the UN Security Council’s use of individual sanctions in the 1990s, which intensified from 2001. In most cases, neither the states implementing these UN Security Council measures (nor the EC, where it implements them in EC law) had provided hearings to listed persons or conducted inquiries into the merits of a listing. They simply followed and applied (as United Nations member states are required to do under the United Nations Charter) the UN Security Council listings, for example under UN Security Council Resolution 1267.27 Member states often have had no independent information in freezing a person’s assets—they do so simply because the name appears on the UN Security Council list. The UN Security Council did not initially have anything remotely approaching an adequate procedure for listed persons to contest the listing and seek removal from the list, let alone an ex ante procedure providing an opportunity for those under consideration for listing to make representations. The state of the person’s nationality or residence could request delisting, but initiating this process was discretionary, it then required bilateral negotiations with the listing state which might be protracted or fruitless, and it did not result in delisting unless and until the relevant UN Security Council sanctions committee so decided by consensus. This led to a great deal of dissatisfaction and frustration among government representatives of many states, including Germany, Indonesia, Sweden and others. The delisting procedures were reformed somewhat in 2006–8, in a series of UN Security Council Resolutions and related amendments to the Sanctions Committee guidelines,28 but further reform was still needed for the system to be sustainable and defensible under rule of law principles.

The leading judicial decision is that of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2008, in the joined cases of Kadi v Council and Commission (Kadi), and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission, setting aside decisions of the European Court of First Instance in these two cases, and in effect also rejecting parallel aspects of the Court of First Instance’s decision in Hassan v Council and Commission (Hassan).29 In addressing the claims of the Al

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Barakaat International Foundation, Mr Kadi and Mr Hassan, the Court of First Instance had declared that the UN Security Council is constrained by the United Nations Charter and by norms of *jus cogens*. It asserted authority to determine whether the Sanctions Committee’s listing and delisting procedure complied, in each case, with norms of *jus cogens*. This asserted authority was strongly contested in the ECJ proceedings by the UK, the Netherlands, and France, and it was summarily rejected by the ECJ, on the ground that the jurisdiction of the EC court is to review the EC’s implementing act but not to review the lawfulness of the Security Council resolution itself. This aligns with the ECJ’s view of the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system, but it is also consistent with the more basic point that the ECJ and the Court of First Instance are not United Nations institutions, were not set up by reference to the United Nations, and have received no express mandate to rule on the compliance of United Nations organs with the United Nations Charter or with general international law. The claim that it is proper for any court of law in any legal system to form its own assessment of the conformity of a United Nations decision with standards of *jus cogens* defined by the forum court, in proceedings in which the United Nations is not in any way represented, was impliedly made by the Court of First Instance but not with strong accompanying argumentation. A contrast may be noted with the strenuous efforts the European Commission makes to avoid member states seeking determinations of EC law in non-European Union (EU) tribunals, as for example in its ECJ proceedings against Ireland for launching the MOX Plant arbitration in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.30

Having decided to address the compatibility of the UN Security Council actions with *jus cogens*, the Court of First Instance got into difficulties in finding authoritative sources of normative material to articulate the precise content, and limits, of *jus cogens*, understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from institutional situation of the European Court of Justice, as well as that of the European Court of First Instance and that of the European Court of Justices, differs in important ways from that of a national court and colours the approach taken in these cases, but I refer to this jurisprudence because of its significance in global administrative law issues that national courts will face more and more. The Swiss Federal Court in 2007, in a comparable case, took a somewhat similar approach to the Court of First Instance, accepting that review of the legality of Security Council resolutions by reference to a *jus cogens* standard might be proper, while holding that no violation of *jus cogens* had occurred. See Nada v SECO, Bundesgericht, 14 November 2007, 133 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts II 450 (Switzerland).

30 European Court of Justice, Case C–459/03, European Commission v Ireland, Judgment of 30 May 2006. In the Iron Rhine case, the Netherlands and Belgium were careful to consult the European Commission about the scope before moving forward with the arbitration: see Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Belgium v The Netherlands), Award of 24 May 2003, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org (accessed 27 August 2008).
which no derogation is possible’. 31 In *Kadi* the Court of First Instance concluded that, despite the lack of any effective judicial mechanism for review of the Sanctions Committee’s actions, the Sanctions Committee’s own procedures ‘constitute another reasonable method of affording adequate protection to the applicant’s fundamental rights as recognized by *jus cogens*’. 32 In *Hassan* the Court of First Instance held that the asset freeze ‘is not incompatible with the fundamental rights of the human person falling within the ambit of *jus cogens*, in light of the objective of fundamental interest for the international community’ of combating terrorism. 33 This and other passages may be interpreted as introducing an attenuated proportionality test into the assessment of possible infringements of *jus cogens*: does the measure have a legitimate objective, how important is the objective, are the rights-infringing measures actually taken disproportionate to that objective? This is not untenable, but it pulls against the standard view, already accepted by the Court of First Instance, that no derogation is permitted from *jus cogens* norms.

The ECJ in *Kadi* stepped neatly around these difficulties, holding that the EU Courts did not here have jurisdiction to review, even by reference to a *jus cogens* standard, the Security Council’s resolutions (it did not address the question whether designations of named persons might be acts of a different legal nature from the adoption of resolutions); and holding that the applicants were entitled to a full review of the EC’s own acts, not one limited to assessment of compatibility with *jus cogens*. Thus the ECJ was able to frame the specific norms at issue in these cases in terms of fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general principles of Community law, rather than *jus cogens*: rights to be heard, to effective judicial review by a court, to property, and to put a case concerning property restrictions to the competent authority. The ECJ confined itself to deciding whether the acts of EU institutions and member states comported with EU law (including human rights law, and the provisions of EU law enabling and requiring that effect be given to United Nations Charter obligations); whether these subsume all the norms of *jus cogens* is an issue the ECJ did not address. 34 On this approach, the UN Security Council process could be, and was, assessed by the European Courts, but simply to establish whether it in itself addressed the requirements and could thus be relied upon as a substitute for EU or national review mechanisms.

Insofar as the affected individuals had insufficient opportunity to trigger an adequate review process, it is conceivable that a remedy would
be for the EU itself (unlikely in practice, but perhaps indirectly through bringing together different national review tribunals) or for the member states directly involved in implementing the assets freeze to establish a review procedure, perhaps involving a specially appointed judge or tribunal with access to confidential information. Such a mechanism could operate in cases where a person alleges mistake of identity, or lack of evidence. It could also be used in periodic reviews, where a person or organisation claims either that new exculpatory evidence has been found, or that they have reformed. A finding by a review tribunal that a person should not have been, or should not now be, listed, would be made public. It would not in itself compel the state or the EU to terminate the listing, but would raise pressure on the UN Security Council to act, and could trigger an obligation of compensation to be held in an escrow account. Such a review mechanism could address state actions dealing with matters such as household expenses exceptions to freezes, family assets and succession to assets on the death of the listed person.

In summary, a finding that a rule or decision of an external governance institution is contrary to *jus cogens* undoubtedly provides a compelling reason for not giving weight to it, but institutional issues counsel national (and supranational) courts to be cautious before setting themselves up as judges of compatibility with *jus cogens* in any but extreme cases. The legal consequences of a finding of a violation of *jus cogens* are also likely to require more intricate legal analysis than the simple propositions in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that a treaty is void if incompatible with a norm of *jus cogens* existing at the time the treaty was made, or becomes void and terminates if the norm of *jus cogens* emerges later.35 In global administrative governance, the problems of the meaning and consequences of invalidity, and of incompatibility, involve more complex problems even than those that have perplexed many systems of national administrative law,36 and have not yet been studied nearly enough.

(3) Customary international law

‘Customary international law’ is often used as the basis for claims about the quotidian aspects of global administrative law (conduct of administrative processes which, while important, do not involve great questions of war and peace, crimes against humanity and the like). To give one of numerous examples, a North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Arbitral Tribunal used customary international law in *Pope & Talbott Inc v Canada* in considering whether the Canadian government’s administra-

tive dealings with this softwood lumber producer met the international minimum standard. However, even with regard to the international minimum standard a state must observe in its dealings with aliens in relation to their property – an area on which there are numerous legal decisions and bodies of state practice over many decades – debates are rife as to how the law now applies to various kinds of administrative actions. This is indicated by the tensions between the Pope & Talbott Inc v Canada tribunal and the three NAFTA state parties who together issued a note of interpretation, in effect, challenging the tribunal’s approach. Such uncertainty is rife with regard to detailed standards for the evaluation of actions of global governance actors not involving the well-established law on state treatment of aliens. The Benthamite line about the unsustainability of real custom under modern conditions carries some weight. Customary law may not be adequate for the regulatory needs of advanced global capitalism: it is not sufficiently precise, it changes too slowly, it gives too much weight to status quo interests and too much negotiating power to hold-outs. More than that, the social conditions for customary international law, involving repeat interactions between foreign ministries, have been displaced by the innumerable nodes of interaction in contemporary global governance. New customs will not always emerge with enough stability of obligation in the casual interactions fostered by monetised global markets.

Thus, while relatively abstract principles of rule-making and decision-making (such as due process and non-corruption) may be customary international law in the traditional sense, it seems unlikely that customary international law (in the mode of widespread state practice accompanied by opinion juris) provides a sufficient or satisfactory basis for articulating much of the detailed body of global administrative law which national courts might use to appraise acts of external governance actors. Custom provides the authoritative basis for one important form of positive international law. But its role in providing a basis for fast-changing norms among many kinds of actors must be a truncated one.

(4) General international law
The use of general international law as a resource for inter-regime accommodation in international legal practice is long established. Some of the reasons for its use are illustrated by the decision of the England and


Wales Court of Appeal in *Occidental v Ecuador*, a case in which Ecuador sought to challenge an adverse arbitral award issued against the state by an arbitral tribunal established under the Ecuador-United States bilateral investment treaty (BIT). Ecuador’s challenge came before the English courts because, although the case had no other relation to the United Kingdom, the seat of the arbitration was England. Occidental argued that the Court should find Ecuador’s challenge non-justiciable on the ground that it involved interpreting an inter-state treaty (the BIT) not incorporated into United Kingdom law, and thus trenched on the relations of foreign sovereigns inter se (that is, relations between the United States and Ecuador). The Court rejected Occidental’s argument. While the BIT was indeed a treaty between foreign sovereigns, the agreement to arbitrate was between Ecuador (whose consent to arbitrate was given by the BIT) and Occidental (whose consent was given by it in the request for arbitration). This agreement was, in the Court’s view, governed by international law, even though Occidental is not a governmental entity. Thus the norms the Court should apply to it were to be found in international law, not in Ecuadorian or other national law.

*Occidental v Ecuador* uses general international law as a legitimate (because overarching) means to address inter-institutional review on issues concerning global commerce and investment, and related questions of property and social policy. A different use of general international law is in the ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ that the International Court of Justice relied upon in *The Corfu Channel Case* (in which Albania had failed to warn the British navy of mines posing an imminent danger to life), or that Judge Simma discusses in addressing physical assaults by the Democratic Republic of the Congo personnel on people waiting at Kinshasa airport in the *Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo*, or that judges of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea have applied in condemning unnecessary violence against seafarers when a coastal state is arresting a vessel. In such cases, the tribunals reached beyond applicable treaties and relied upon such a notion to establish a rule against the offending conduct, without seeking to show that the rule derived from widely followed practice accompanied by opinion juris as standard accounts of customary international law require.

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39 *Occidental v Ecuador* [2005] EWCA Civ 1116. The substantive case concerned Ecuador’s denial of a value added tax exemption for oil exported by Occidental.

40 *The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits)* [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22.


42 *M.V. Saiga (no. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea)*, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Judgment of 1 July 1999, para 158: ‘considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international law’. 
This kind of approach seems consonant with the late 18th and early 19th century understanding of the law of nations on great moral questions, slavery above all. As Joseph Story framed his view in United States v La Jeune Eugenie:

[N]o [customary] practice whatsoever can obliterate the fundamental distinction between right and wrong, and that every nation is at liberty to apply to another the correct principle, whenever both nations by their public acts recede from such practice, and admit the injustice or cruelty of it.43

Custom can be part of the overlay of positive law that displaces the application of reason-based natural law and morality, but custom is not itself natural law or morality.

General international law might be a way of framing an accurate account of global administrative law. Some analogy may be drawn from common law – judges have been able over time to construct systems of administrative law (admittedly, somewhat different systems in different common law countries) without comprehensive specification in statutory or constitutional text. It is now possible plausibly to assert that some of the core principles are so deeply part of the common law that they will often be applied by judges in hard cases, even in the face of apparently inconsistent statutes or constitutional provisions. But the method of the common law, in a more or less unified judicial system, for the most part built on a unified professional formation of judges and lawyers educated for that system, is more precise than that of general international law.44 While ‘general international law’ is an acceptable category in that many participants in international legal processes would not reject it, it is not methodologically precise. At this level of generality, the content of its norms, and their authority in relation to competing norms, are difficult to specify and evaluate.

(5) ‘General principles of law’ as international law

One possible approach to a global administrative law problem is to try to utilise (and enlarge) the rubric of ‘general principles of law’ as a source of international law (it is listed as such a source in the Statute of the International Court of Justice, although the fit with jus inter gentes has troubled many). Such a project to accommodate the principles of global administrative law faces two practical obstacles that, while not insuperable, will not easily be overcome. First, the sources of global administrative law are more diverse, its content much fuller and its scope more

43 United States v La Jeune Eugenie (1822) 26 F Cas 832, 846 (CCD Mass), per Story J.
44 In addition, the elusive concept of custom remains much more central in international law than in the common law.
comprehensive than the propositions the International Court of Justice has hitherto endorsed in its very limited jurisprudence of ‘general principles of law’. Secondly, the status of ‘general principles’ would imply that the principles of global administrative law all enjoy the hierarchical status of international law vis-à-vis other normative systems, such as national law. Practice is a long way from this at present. Principles are applied, but often without a strong sense of hierarchical obligation or even of formal sources.

A different and more specific jurisprudence of ‘general principles’ has developed within the EU. Its application in global governance is illustrated in Kadi, where the ECJ grounded its assertion that respect for human rights, or for fundamental rights, is a condition for the lawfulness of EC acts, in the holding that fundamental rights are general principles of law. General principles of law are to be drawn by the Court from the constitutional traditions common to member states, and from the international instruments for the protection of human rights on which they have collaborated, special significance attaching in this regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Some of the problems in extending this already established analysis to harder cases were manifested in Hassan, where the Court of First Instance sought to enhance the possibility that an individual listed under a UN Security Council sanctions resolution might be able to obtain reconsideration of that listing, by determining that EU law obliged member states to exercise diplomatic protection where a national or resident sought delisting. Since no such obligation is formulated in the relevant EC regulation, the legal foundations for this determination were said to be either the rights traditions of the EU member states, or the fundamental rights respected by the EU and set forth particularly in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The stretch involved is apparent: neither source is compelling in establishing an obligation of diplomatic protection.45

(6) Conflict of laws
Conflict of laws approaches offer a potentially attractive pluralism and neatness of application in situations where one legal regime or tribunal recognises that the law of another legal regime governs the substance of the issue. These approaches encompass methodologies for deciding

45 Kadi, ECJ (n 29) para 283–84 and 303–4; Hassan, Court of First Instance (n 29) paras 110–22. The ECJ in Kadi did not address the diplomatic protection obligation formulated in Hassan. In practice, the effectiveness of diplomatic protection is variable. A state raising a delisting claim half-heartedly will have little effect, and even states such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Germany, when energetically seeking a delisting in the years immediately leading up to Hassan, had great difficulties in getting the UN Security Council’s delisting procedure actually to reach this result.
which body of law should be applied (choice of law) and for making exceptions on grounds such as the public policy of the forum. Disagreement over the criteria for deciding which law governs, and what its content is, or over exceptions such as those grounded in the public policy of the forum, or over jurisdiction and institutional issues, can make these solutions much less clear cut.

Thus far conflict of laws approaches have not been applied very systematically to administrative laws and decisions taken outside the forum. One obstacle has been reluctance to apply most foreign public law (the revenue rule), although this is becoming more attenuated, as exemplified by the willingness of the New Zealand courts to prohibit publication in New Zealand of the Spycatcher book in order to give effect to United Kingdom public law.46 The allocation of supervisory powers and decisional authority among administrative authorities of different states (and in some cases to inter-state institutions too) has become a staple of transnational regulatory governance. Thus the widely subscribed Hague Convention on inter-country adoption47 allocates to the agencies of the child’s country of origin the determination that the child is adoptable and that parental consent has been obtained where required, and allocates to the administrative authorities of the country of the adopting family the responsibility to assess their suitability and to supervise post-adoption activities. In situations where such a coordinating scheme (with duties of cooperation and so on) has not been established, national courts seized of litigation may find themselves having to help formulate principles of such a scheme. Their own experience in the allocation of judicial jurisdiction and competence among the courts of different countries will be of only limited analogical relevance, because the ways in which governance powers operate in layers, with functional overlaps and structures of cooperation, do not mirror the more territorial, exclusive and horizontal view taken in allocations among different countries' courts. Conflict of laws approaches to choice of law have focused more on formal national laws and institutions than on the diverse array of networks, and hybrid and private orderings that comprise contemporary global administration. In sum, the effort to apply conflict of laws approaches to global regulatory governance problems is only just beginning in the academic literature,48 but this will become an increasingly important source of ideas for national courts.


48 I draw in this section on unpublished work by Horatia Muir Watt. See also H Buxbaum ‘Transnational regulatory litigation’ (2006) 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 251; P S Ber-
Comity, connoting a respectful engagement with or deference to a decision issued on the same specific subject matter by a different body, has become a notable feature of contemporary United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on global governance issues, notably in opinions of Breyer J. In purporting to base comity on a discretionary choice rather than on international obligation, and in proceeding without an account of the role of international law in the regulation of comity decisions, the United States courts have drawn criticism. *Republic of Austria v Altmann*, while open to the same criticism for treating the immunity of foreign sovereigns in United States courts as a matter of comity rather than international legal obligation, has potential jurisgenerative implications for that reason. In particular, claimants in national courts whose suits against foreign sovereigns for human rights abuses have been defeated by immunity claims have in the past been unable to convince the European Court of Human Rights that upholding the defendant’s immunity breaches their rights. The reason has been that international law requires foreign sovereign immunity in such circumstances. But the *Altmann* analysis, if widely accepted, would defeat that argument and potentially give greater scope to national court adjudication of foreign sovereign activities in exceptional cases. Thus the comity approach, while lacking a sophisticated theory of legal obligation and authority, has significant policy attractions for those who envisage a growing role of national courts in supervision of external entities as part of the juridical structure of global governance.

IV A NEW APPROACH?: ‘PUBLICNESS’ CRITERIA IN APPRAISING EXTERNAL RULES AND DECISIONS

When a national judge is presented with a rule or decision from a different legal system (in particular, a legal system of a different order, such as an international law rule or a rule from a non-treaty global governance instrument), the national judge in practice often does not simply use a formal analysis based on the source of the international law rule (treaty, or custom), nor does the judge have recourse to simple pragmatism which says that it is all a matter of policy choice in the circumstances of each case. Mattias Kumm argues that national judges do, and certainly should, begin


by attaching presumptive but not dispositive weight to complying with international law to maintain the integrity of it as law, and then go on to analyse the specific external act and the possibilities for the court in terms of jurisdiction/competence, proportionality, protection of basic individual rights and a commitment to the principle of subsidiarity.51 This approach is not limited to the usual question of how national courts should receive international law, but opens the possibility of a wider unified theory, which also provides a basis for international judges to use in considering national law, and for different bodies in global governance to consider rules emitted by other such bodies. Kumm points to insufficiencies both in the standard focus on nationally-framed conflicts-type rules for the reception or exclusion of international law, and in non-authority based dialogue-between-courts approaches. He argues instead for an approach which takes authority seriously but regards it as graduated, and which develops rules for engagement that provide a normative basis (not simply a sources basis) for dealing with different cases.

There are strong grounds for hesitation about the possibilities of such a confidently constitutionalist approach being viable in the often incoherent interactions and highly pluralistic values structure prevailing in much of global governance. Nevertheless, the emerging global administrative law provides some useful concepts and ideas for national courts when addressing such questions in relation to sub-treaty rules and specific decisions of global regulatory governance institutions.52 In this section, I will argue that the weight given to a regulatory governance decision or administrative rule adopted by an external institution should depend, in part, on the degree to which that institution, in adopting that rule or decision, complied with criteria of ‘publicness’.

‘Publicness’ is a necessary element in the concept of law under modern democratic conditions. The claim is that the quality of publicness, and the related quality of generality, are necessary to the concept of law in an era of democratic jurisprudence.53 By publicness is meant the claim made for law that it has been wrought by the whole society, by the public, and the connected claim that law addresses matters of concern to the society as such.

Publicness thus exists as a desideratum wherever there is democratic law. The components of publicness need not necessarily be expressed in legal terms – they are also parts of the process of democratic political

52 I am not dealing in this paper with the core conflict of laws or choice of law questions about giving effect to the laws of a foreign state or the judgment of a foreign state’s court.
53 J Waldron ‘Can there be a democratic jurisprudence?’, NYU PILT Research Paper 08–35, November 2008 (SSRN). Waldron’s ideas about publicness in national democratic legal systems inspired this part of my project about global governance, and I am deeply indebted to him.
organisation, and of social expectations for publicly-oriented institutions. Insofar as they are applied by courts, however, they are typically expressed in legal terms. In my view, it is possible to identify several general principles of public law and some more detailed rules or precepts flowing from them, which are accepted in many democratic legal systems, and which give content to the requirement or aspiration of publicness in law. I am going to argue that application of these principles helps produce an assessment of the degree of publicness followed by an external entity in producing a rule or decision that a national court must appraise. Before doing that, I will try to sketch some of the general principles of public law that provide content to the requirement or aspiration of publicness.

(1) Components of publicness: general principles of public law

General principles of public law combine formal qualities with normative commitments in the enterprise of channelling, managing, shaping and constraining political power. These principles provide some content and specificity to abstract requirements of publicness in law. Principles potentially applicable within any system of public law, and in relations between different systems of public law, may include to different degrees some of the following. This is merely an indicative list, without any comparative or doctrinal analysis, but it is sufficient to suggest that the principles embodied in such a conception of public law are significant. These are normative principles that do real work, yet they are not principles of substantive justice in the Dworkinian sense. In accepting the idea of the rule of law, of the unity of basic normative principles rather than the rule of arbitrary power or the rule of the philosopher, this is the kind of list one gets.

(a) The principle of legality

One major function of public law is the channelling and organising of power. This is accomplished in part through a principle of legality – actors within the system of power are constrained to act in accordance with the rules of the system. This principle of legality enables rule-makers to control rule-administrators. The agent is constrained to adhere to the terms of the delegation made by the principal. In a complex system of delegation, it is often preferable to empower third parties to control the agent in accordance with criteria set by the principal, creating the basis for a third-party rights dynamic even in this principal-agent model. In the case of inter-state institutions, the states establishing the institution often style themselves as principals (severally or collectively) with the institution

54 See generally D Dyzenhaus (ed) The Unity of Public Law (2003); see especially M Taggart ‘The tub of public law’ in ibid 455.
as agent, but their direct control of the agent may be attenuated, a problem they typically mitigate both by legal controls and by limiting the operational capacity of the agent. Thus international institutions usually depend on individual states to act as agents in operational implementation.

(b) The principle of rationality
The culture of justification has been accompanied by pressure on decision-makers (and in some countries, on rule-makers) to give reasons for their decisions, and to produce a factual record supporting the decision where necessary. This is part of both political and legal culture. In both contexts it leads those institutions with review power into continuous debates about whether, and on what standard, to review the substantive rationality of the decision: manifestly unreasonable, incorrect, and so on.

(c) The principle of proportionality
The requirement of a relationship of proportionality between means and ends has become a powerful procedural tool in European public law, and increasingly in international public law, although some national courts (for example, in the United Kingdom) for many years balked at unfamiliar arguments based on it.

(d) Rule of law
The demand for the rule of law can mean many things. The dominant approach is proceduralist, meaning a general acceptance among officials (and in the society) of particular deliberative and decisional procedures. This is prima facie in tension with a conception of the rule of law as simply a structure of clear rules, reliably and fairly enforced, without regard to their substantive content (the ‘rule book’ conception); and with ‘the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of individual rights’ (the ‘rights conception’). Proceduralists argue for adhering to procedures even at the price of unsatisfactory outcomes – but face problems in explaining why any decision taken in accordance with prescribed procedures should not then be part of the law which adherents of the rule of law must uphold. David Dyzenhaus has argued for an approach which shifts the focus of rule of law from law (and rules) to the element of ruling – so a

breach of procedural requirements is not unthinkable, but involves a compromise of legality that must be carefully weighed.58

(e) Human rights
What is meant here are the basic rights, the protection of which by the legal system is almost intrinsic (or natural) to a modern public legal system. This category overlaps a lot with the previous four categories, but is listed separately to leave scope for arguments that some human rights (perhaps of bodily integrity, privacy, personality) are likely to be protected by public law as an intrinsic matter (without textual authority), yet without being subsumed into ‘rule of law’.

(2) Applying publicness criteria to external entities producing rules or decisions in global governance
My argument is that, subject to other constraints and considerations, national courts will, and should, give more weight to rules or decisions produced by external entities where these more comprehensively meet requirements of publicness. The French Conseil d’Etat took an approach of this kind in exercising judicial review of France’s denial of visas to persons who had been listed in the Schengen Information System (SIS) by other countries party to the Schengen agreements regulating free movement across borders in the Schengen zone. Ms Hamssaoui, a Moroccan citizen and resident, who was denied a visa to visit family in France because of a report on her in the SIS, succeeded in having this denial annulled as she was not given reasons for the report nor even the name of the country which had entered the report.59 In another case, German officials had listed Ms Forabosco (a Romanian citizen living in Bucharest and seeking a French visa) on the SIS, on the basis that she had earlier been denied asylum in Germany. The Conseil d’Etat in effect applied the principle of legality in determining that the German officials had made a legal error, because refusal of asylum is not a legally permitted reason under Article 96 of the Schengen Agreement for reporting a person on the SIS. The bold step of a French court in reviewing the act of a German official was partly based on the French court’s understanding that national courts seized of a case had a governance role in correcting erroneous SIS reports, a preferable governance arrangement than requiring her to institute parallel proceedings in German courts.60

This ‘publicness’ analysis could be applied to the Chicago Convention system and the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization, in

60 Conseil d’Etat, 9 June 1999, No. 190384, M et Mme Forabosco.
the kind of situation exemplified by the *Air Line Pilots’ Association* case. A national court faced with uncertainty as to whether the controlling law of the forum makes a Standard or Recommended Practice obligatory or not might consider the following factors: the degree to which the International Civil Aviation Organization and its participants acted in accordance with the relevant rules and the acceptability of these rules; the degree to which membership of the Organization includes or gives real consideration to all of the relevant interests; the relationship of proportionality between the legitimate end and the means employed; Lon Fuller-type criteria of publication; even-handed application and the like; and the effect of the Standard or Recommended Practice on basic human rights.

Insofar as a balance had been struck between maximising navigation safety and fair treatment of pilots in the use of cockpit voice recordings, on the one hand, and fairness to crash victims and their families on the other, the degree to which these interests had been fully represented and fairly weighed in the International Civil Aviation Organization process would be another relevant factor for a national court. Beyond ‘publicness’ considerations, the national court might also take account of the possible effects of its decision in relation to the whole global governance regime, giving different weight to such questions depending on the whole context.

The justification for a democratic polity acquiescing in the work of, or appointing, an external rule-maker or decision-maker within a structure of global governance is greater if that entity meets requirements of publicness. In addition to their normative attractions, these requirements may be instrumentally useful, helping to ensure a substantively better rule or decision, and they may help increase buy-in to it.

V. CONCLUSION

Both functional and normative considerations must be weighed in considering the desirability of national courts acting with increasing frequency and reach as review agencies in relation to the norms and decisions of global regulatory institutions. As noted, this does not usually involve a direct assertion of jurisdiction over the international regulatory body. Few if any of the cases discussed in Section II above involved an action directly against the external entity. The procedural posture and the substantive law of the forum are thus of central importance to each specific case. More abstractly, it may be observed that a single national court might hesitate to undertake such a review in certain circumstances. National judicial review may create disadvantages for the forum state or persons within it, which may in itself provide a motivation for judicial hesitation. In policy terms, there may be a significant reason for prudence if the result of a strong review would be to create a non-level playing field for economic actors or a severely uneven imbalance with other states. A
single national court cannot easily set a common standard so that a uniform approach to the same international regulatory rules or decisions is taken in different national courts. These courts face a collective action problem: if they are unable to reach a common approach, it may be preferable for them to remain circumspect. If a clear rule of international law exists, or a decisive interpretation by a competent international body exists, this may then be followed by the national court even if it is not binding under the national law of the forum. If such an international body exists but has not yet acted, the national court may delay action or give the narrowest decision needed, in order not to imply that the international body or other national courts will be wrong if they act differently.

In many situations, the national court may be the only plausible forum for serious review, placing on the national judge a burden of not wishing to overreach the court’s jurisdiction, nor to act counter-productively, but at the same time not wishing to deny justice: ‘if not me, then who?’ A national court may indeed give leadership in taking on a problematic practice of an external body. Such a decision may be a signal to other national courts. If they respond to it, a transnational normative approach may be established, often drawing also on international judicial decisions and on the kinds of international sources discussed above in Section III. The principles of the emerging global administrative law, and the background justificatory ideas of publicness that make them persuasive, provide guidance as to the norms and the approaches to review around which national courts may increasingly coalesce.

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61 This is the theme of current work by Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs, and by Joseph Weiler. This paragraph and the next are indebted to discussions with them.

62 Francesca Bignami shows how English courts, by judicious exercise of an indirect review function, pushed the EC competition authorities into adopting more due process in their investigations of private economic actors. F Bignami, ‘Creating European rights: national values and supranational interests’ (2005) 11 Columbia Journal of European Law 241. Many thanks to Richard B. Stewart for discussion of this point and for numerous ideas on this paper, this project, and this field.