

**From Scrutiny to Shame:  
Social Pressure in US Anti- Human Trafficking Policy\***

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Prepared for the Hauser Colloquium at NYU School of Law on October 25, 2012. An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the Workshop on “Tools of International Pressure,” Yale University, June 1-2, 2012 and for the (cancelled) 2012 APSA Annual Meeting, August 30-September 2, 2012, New Orleans, LA. Draft only. Please do not cite without authors’ permission.

\* The authors are grateful to Paulette Lloyd for sharing data she collected for related projects.

## **From Scrutiny to Shame: Social Pressure in US Anti- Human Trafficking Policy**

*This article argues that “information” – even if it is not scientific, even if it is not multilaterally validated – is a powerful social tool in international relations. Early theories on international institutions stressed that their ability to monitor member state activities increased transparency and accountability. The new Global Information Age has broadened access to information and thereby made it even more powerful. We argue that governments respond not only to public criticism and shaming, but also to scrutiny itself. That is, the mere inclusion in a monitoring scheme may prompt governments to take action to avoid potential shaming. We test our argument in the context of the United States’ efforts to combat trafficking in persons, a central component of which is an annual report that monitors countries’ progress and, uniquely, also publicly grades their performance. Our analysis focuses on state criminalization of human trafficking, a primary component of the US policy. We find that states respond faster to harsher grades, and that they react when their grade first drops below a threshold, but we also find that countries are more likely to criminalize human trafficking when they simply are included in the report. Because the US also ties the reports to economic assistance, we test whether the findings hold even when we control for aid and material sanctioning. Aid does enhance the effect of shaming, but both shaming and scrutiny contribute independently to state decisions to criminalize.*

### **I. Introduction**

Peer pressure is pervasive in international politics. From military invasion to the subtle raising of a diplomatic eyebrow, from occupation to conditional aid, international relations is all about how states attempt to influence one another’s policies in ways they believe will contribute to their security and welfare. As nations have become increasingly interdependent, the range of issues on which they have attempted to exert influence has expanded. The integration of markets and the interconnectedness of societies on many new dimensions have created new reasons for states to try to influence the conditions in and policies of their neighbors. Historically, international relations were focused primarily on state security through the use of military force.

Today, states are much more likely to influence one another through various forms of social pressure. Indeed, such pressures are broadly cited as one of the major mechanisms for policy diffusion globally in the last few decades (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008).

Transnational crime is but one example of this trend. Economic liberalization has increased the possibilities for agents to prosper from transnational activities that run counter to those banned in other jurisdictions. Lower transaction costs have fostered trade and immigration the world over, but these conditions have also fueled transnational black markets for narcotics, weapons, and even for human beings. Increasingly, governments have strong incentives to press for a coordinated approach, lest such activities spill across borders unabated. And increasingly, they are turning to various forms of peer pressure to get results.

The United States has played the key role in defining, coordinating and strengthening criminal law world-wide. We have seen this leadership in a number of areas, most spectacularly in the “war on drugs” prosecuted internationally over the course of the last three decades. More recently, the United States has taken a hard line that human trafficking should be criminalized in both domestic and international law, and has devoted significant resources to encouraging other countries to do the same. No other country has more assiduously tried to document, publicize and influence countries’ policy efforts than has the United States. The main tools have been scrutiny and shaming. This paper asks: How and to what extent have such efforts to shape other countries’ human trafficking been effective?

The US policy on human trafficking is particularly interesting because it is aimed at countries worldwide. It mixes different diplomatic strategies such as monitoring, shaming through rating, and ultimately (through very rarely) sanctioning. Some countries appear to be special targets, while others face no US pressure to speak of. The different treatment and the

variation in responses provide an opportunity to examine questions of the relative efficacy of monitoring and “rating” to pressure governments to adopt reform. This research can inform both theoretical and practical debates about how, and why and to what extent social coercion works. Do governments respond to threats to their reputation brought about by official shaming, in this case by the US government? More basically, do they alter their behavior when they will be scrutinized *at all*? And do these forms of social pressure have effects even when we control for material sanctioning? We find robust evidence that “information” – even if it is not scientific, even if it is not multilaterally validated – is a powerful social tool in international relations. The answers to these questions will inform how our understandings of international politics in what most people now recognize as a Global Information Age.

## **II. Theories of coercive policy influence: social shaming, management and material sanctions**

Considerable scholarship has focused on the ability of external actors to promote foreign reforms of varying types, including reform of democratic institutions, human rights practices, and economic reforms using tools short of physical force. Scholars have questioned whether states respond better to incentives in the form of punishments or rewards (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996), whether state elites are susceptible to socialization or habituation into a set of norms (Checkel 2001), or how much state willingness to behave in a certain way is a function of state capacity and international management strategies (Chayes and Chayes 1993).

Theories of coercion generally rest on a simple mechanism: external actors are said to be able to alter the cost and/or benefits of particular policies or behaviors sufficiently to encourage actors responsible for those policies or behaviors to change them in desired ways. Traditional

rationalist theories argue that countries are driven by incentives such as aid or trade, and if withdrawal is threatened, they might be expected to alter policies to avoid losing it. Several scholars have found that ‘coercive’ forms of influence, such as linking political reforms to membership in international organizations like the European Union have been effective (Jacoby 2004; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003; Vachudova 2005). South Africa is often cited as one of the most successful cases of economic sanctions in modern history (Klotz 1995). The key issues in the coercion literature are: whether leaders’ (or those responsible for policy) utility is influenced by coercive tools; what kinds of coercion influence their utility; and whether the actual application of any given coercive measure is credible, or if so, can it be circumvented. Coercion is more likely to work when key decision-makers’ utility is impacted by the credible threat or application of measures that are difficult to circumvent.

The use of economic coercion (trade or aid sanctions for example) faces a number of difficulties that have been discussed in policy circles and academic research. First, it is not clear that leaders’ utility can be affected through economic sanctions. Autocracies seem especially able to shield themselves from the effects of sanctioning programs (Lektzian and Souva 2007). Moreover, some studies have found that sanctions sometimes do destabilize governing regimes (Marinov 2005), but the result can be unanticipated repression as a government tries to cling to power (Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2010; Wood 2008). Second, economic sanctions are easy to circumvent; unless the sanctioner is a major economic power, or there is broad cooperation among states, or if substitute sources of economic benefits are possible (McLean and Whang 2010). For this reason, numerous studies emphasize that economic coercion is more likely to be effective when applied through an international institution than when applied unilaterally (Bapat and Clifton Morgan 2009; Martin 1992); even so, research reveals numerous weaknesses in how

the international financial institutions have implemented conditionality (Hermes and Lensink 2001). And third, such sanctions may not be very credible, especially if they involve reducing aid to an ally<sup>1</sup> or blocking lucrative trade or investment opportunities for private actors who can be expected to lobby against them (Rarick 2007). While some scholars have called for “hard linkage” that makes trade conditional on specific behavioral changes (Hafner-Burton 2005), many studies indicate that for one or more of the reasons discussed above, economic coercion is quite often an ineffective way to encourage or change state behavior. Scholars of economic conditionality are divided about whether it can achieve economic policy changes (Collier 1997; Killick 1997). Studies reveal that direct sanctions are often impracticable and even harmful, and largely unable to induce change (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990; Pape 1997).

“Soft coercion” – or the application of various forms of scrutiny, shaming and social pressure – can theoretically affect a government’s utilities, but such coercion works in a fundamentally different way. Because it does not involve the denial of material benefits, government cannot easily externalize social pressures; that is, unlike the denial of aid or trade directed social pressures must be borne by the target. Soft coercion is not fungible, and cannot be passed on to civilians or other actors. It *names its target*, and while the target can deny its behavior or decry the appropriateness of being singled out, it cannot easily *deflect* social pressure onto other actors. Furthermore, soft coercion, while not costless, does not in itself impose costs on either the official sender or its civil society. For these reasons, what soft coercion lacks in material impact it may well make up in credibility and sustainability.

But why should a government be swayed by soft coercion at all? Soft coercion involves the conscious manipulation of social incentives, including blaming and shaming on the one hand,

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<sup>1</sup> Although recent research suggests that the United States, for example, is not reluctant to sanction allies (Cox and Drury 2006); other studies suggest that sanctions are more effective against allies than non-allied states (Taehee and Whang 2010).

and praising and “back-patting” on the other (Goodman and Jinks 2004; Johnston 2001). A government may or may not be sensitive to such social incentives. One thing that soft coercion does have in common with economic sanctions is that it tends to be more effective when imposed by a socially important actor or broad group of actors. Scholars of “social impact theory” emphasize the importance to the target of the actor or group of actors engaging in pressure, the nature and extent of the target’s exposure to the group, and, to some extent, the size of the group attempting to enforce conformity (Latané 1981). Social pressures in international relations can be exercised by highly respected or “hegemonic” state actors, or especially through international organizations that coordinate expectations, reinforce social standards and legitimate specific kinds of behavior (Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Johnston 2001). Some scholars argue that such pressures matter because states care about their international reputation, which in turn facilitates their ability to cooperate with other states (Guzman 2002; Kelley 2007; Schelling 1997; Simmons 2000). Others point out simply that government elites seek social acceptance among the world’s state leaders (Johnston 2001, 500).

Shaming is a form of soft coercion that is commonly used in an effort to influence state behavior by actors that either do not have material resources or else cannot legitimately use them under the circumstances they face. Few governments can credibly and effectively threaten economic sanctions to influence a government’s human rights practices for example. Shaming is therefore a common, if not essential, aspect of behavior modification in the human rights area (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Risse and Sikkink 1999) even though empirical studies find fairly ambiguous results from this strategy (Hafner-Burton 2008). Shaming is also used by international organizations in a range of issue areas in combination with other techniques to encourage implementation of international obligations in domestic law and practice (Joachim,

Reinalda, and Verbeek 2008; Lebovic and Voeten 2006). Especially useful to the shaming process is the use of global benchmarks to explicitly compare a target's behavior with international standards (Weisband 2000).

Perhaps the softest kind of social pressure is that connected with the simple awareness of external scrutiny. Psychological researchers have long pointed to the fact that experimental subjects may respond merely to the fact that they are being studied and are thus aware of being "observed" (Adair 1984). Theories of international relations have emphasized that one important function of international institutions is the provision of information based on monitoring or surveillance of regime members (Keohane 1984), and recent studies theorize that such information can be useful to domestic audiences to shape policy and hold leaders accountable to international standards (Dai 2007). As the Global Information Age makes information accessible to more and more actors, observational pressure alone could potentially encourage states to adopt policies they believe are in keeping with both foreign and domestic expectations. Distinguishing the precise impact of various kinds of coercion – from the threat of sanctions to the implicit scrutiny of systematic monitoring – is in practice extremely difficult and may not be theoretically necessary. After all, social pressures and material coercion can and often are used alternately or in tandem to influence a target's behavior. The EU and NATO for example have used membership conditionality as well as moderate political costs to garner compliance from target governments (Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek 2008; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006). The relative success of such an approach is consistent with experimental studies that suggest a combination of social and monetary sanctions are most likely to affect behavior (Noussair and Tucker 2005). Direct as well as mediated coercion have been cited as central to



the spread of criminalization in other transnational contexts such as anti-money-laundering policies (Sharman 2008).

While the international relations literature has been obsessed with material sanctions as a policy tool, we are much more interested in the effects of non-material political and social pressures on state behavior. Sanctions are rare in international relations, and even the threat of sanctions is largely not credible, given their spotty and largely unsuccessful history. Governments have learned that military sanctions are extraordinarily costly and that economic sanctions are divisive, hard to target, and easy to circumvent. The exertion of social pressure has few of these drawbacks. Moreover, as information technologies improve, making the collection, validation and dissemination easier than ever, we think it has become much easier to scrutinize and to shame states for their “undesirable” behaviors than ever in the past.

But when and where should such scrutiny and potential shaming matter to state behavior? We argue it should influence policy choice when there has been some degree of global convergence on a behavioral norm; when credible information is available, and when monitoring produces a “focal” behavioral assessment. All of these conditions are roughly in place in the issue area of human trafficking. The existence of the anti-trafficking norm is embodied in the Human Trafficking Protocol to the Transnational Organized Crime Convention of 2000. Increasingly, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations as well as individual states are collecting information on the nature and extent of human trafficking world-wide. This information is being funneled into and shaped by highly visible “Trafficking in Person Reports,” published annually by the United States since 2001.

Human trafficking is therefore an interesting test-case for examining the potential influences of scrutiny and shaming. Earlier studies suggest that “hegemonic pressure” exercised

through ranking schemes have in fact been important in encouraging states to criminalize human trafficking (Lloyd, Simmons, and Stewart 2012). What is not clear, however, is whether being monitored and being rated by the United States Department of State accounts for this effect even when controlling for material pressures such as trade, aid and the threat or use of sanctions. In the following section, we discuss the nature of human trafficking and US policies to reduce it world-wide.

### **III. Nature of the human trafficking problem and US policies**

Human trafficking is the trade in human beings or organs for any purpose, but generally for labor or sexual exploitation.<sup>2</sup> The issue has gained increasing attention since the nineties and it has grown to become an industry of over \$31 billion annually (Besler 2005). Nevertheless, few people are prosecuted for human trafficking, and even fewer convicted. Estimates from 2006 are that for every 800 persons trafficked, only one is convicted (U.S. Department of State 2007).

The adoption in 2000 of the United Nations (UN) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children – as of the summer of 2012 ratified by some 151 states – is a testament to the growing international concern about human trafficking. This increase in attention has been accompanied by an increase in domestic anti-trafficking efforts. Common policy responses involve amending or creating domestic legislation

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<sup>2</sup> In international law, human trafficking is defined as recruiting and transporting people deceptively or coercively for purposes of exploiting them. According to the Human Trafficking Protocol (2000), Article 3(a): "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs..." Text at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffic.htm> . (Accessed 25 June 2010.)

to criminalize trafficking, developing and implementing national action plans to identify and protect victims, arrest traffickers, create transborder cooperation and so on. Cho, Dreyer, and Neumayer (2012) have created an index of performance across the three commonly identified policy areas of protection, prosecution and prevention. As evidenced by figure 1 below, this index shows improvement over time. It is important to note, however, that the number of countries in which we have data also increase over time.




Figure 1: Index of human trafficking policy over time  
 Source: *Anti-trafficking policy index*, <http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/204458.html>

Although the UN and a number of regional organizations—the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe, in particular—have taken leadership roles in the effort to combat human trafficking (Simmons 2012), the US has played a unique and forceful role. Both former Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton contributed to efforts to pass and implement into law the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000. The TVPA enabled the US Congress to create the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP) (located within the Department of State (DOS)). In cooperation with embassies and other actors around the world, the office monitors and rates other countries’ performance, which is then tied to access to US foreign aid (Chuang 2005-2006; DeStefano 2007).

Core to this program is the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report,<sup>3</sup> which assesses governments' efforts on the 3-pronged human trafficking policy of prevention, protection, and prosecution.<sup>4</sup> The report also recommends policy actions that governments should take to address trafficking problems, and rates countries on a Tier system. This system has three "Tiers," with Tier 1 being the best and 3 the worst. In 2003, which was the first U.S. law permitted uncooperative states to be sanctioned, the DOS added a 'watch-list' rating, often considered a "Tier 2.5." Since the report's inception, DOS has issued 1,345 ratings. The modal rating has been "2," which has been given 50 percent of the time. Few countries are totally in the clear: only 18 percent of all rankings since the beginning of the report have been Tier 1. The State Department report has placed countries on the "watch-list" 21 percent of the time, but only 11 percent of the time has the report actually placed a country in the lowest category (Tier 3) that potentially makes it subject to sanctions. Thus, this system potentially allows for limited economic sanctioning, but very few states ever enter the "danger zone" in this regard..<sup>5</sup>

The US Tier rating system began in 2001 by rating some 82 countries,<sup>6</sup> less than half of the membership of the United Nations. The latest report (2012) rates 186 countries. The State Department claims that the decision to render country reports depends on the availability of

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<sup>3</sup> US Trafficking in Persons Reports can be accessed at <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/>.

<sup>4</sup> In general terms, these "three Ps" represent the policy of both the U.S. and the U.N., although the rating system discussed below is a unilateral determination of the U.S.

<sup>5</sup> In response to the tendency of the US TIP office to allow countries to linger on the watch list for several years, in 2008, P.L. 110-457 added a new requirement that Tier 2 watch list countries must be dropped to the Tier 3 category after two consecutive years on the Tier 2 watch list, unless the President issues a waiver. The first year in which this new requirement went into effect was the 2009 TIP report, which means that it was not until 2011 that the new policy was borne out so that watch list countries had to be dropped to Tier 3 if they had been on the watch list since 2009. For a summary of the legislation see [http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams\\_4542.html](http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_4542.html). However, it does not affect our analysis, because in our data, the last year that we study the effect of the ratings is 2010.

<sup>6</sup> The list of countries rated in the first annual report can be found at <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2001/3937.htm>.

reliable information that trafficking in a specific country is “significant.”<sup>7</sup> Allies as well as adversaries are subject to scrutiny, and appear on the lists of all three Tier levels. The State Department claims that new countries are added to the report when credible information becomes available on human trafficking in their jurisdictions – a claim we subject to empirical testing below.<sup>8</sup> The 2004 Report notes explicitly that better information is due, at least in part, to greater cooperation by the countries being investigated.<sup>9</sup> The threshold for inclusion in pre-2009 reports is evidence of 100 or more persons trafficked to, from, or within a country in a given year, but from 2009 new U.S. legislation<sup>10</sup> removed this threshold and thereafter many smaller jurisdictions were rated as well.<sup>11</sup> Recent reports render almost universal coverage.

Sanctioning for Tier 3 rankings began in 2003 and only targets non-humanitarian, non-trade-related assistance and funding for educational and cultural exchange programs. This ranking can also subject countries to US opposition to assistance to them by international financial institutions. About 90 days after the annual rankings are announced in the report, the US President issues a determination as to the action to be taken towards each Tier 3-country. The options are to let the country “off for good behavior” if a country has shown significant improvements (27 instances), to waive sanctions fully (36 instances) or partially (34 instances), or to allow the sanctions to proceed (25 instances – most of them Cuba, North Korea, Burma and Iran – all of which have repeatedly been rated as among the worst offenders with multiple years

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<sup>7</sup> See the 2001 report discussion of “methodology” at <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2001/3929.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> For example, the 2003 report reiterates the 2001 methodology and adds that “Thirty countries are included for the first time in the TIP report due to increased information on the scope and magnitude of trafficking.” See <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/21262.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> See the introduction to the 2004 TP report at <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/34021.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA of 2008) essentially eliminates the 100 victim threshold. For a summary of the legislation see [http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams\\_4542.html](http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_4542.html).

<sup>11</sup> In some of the more recent reports, some countries for which precise trafficking information was not available were not given tier ratings, but are included in the Special Case section, “as they exhibited indications of trafficking.” See [cite exact report].

in Tier 3). While it may be theoretically possible for any country to land on the sanctions list, countries are rarely sanctioned by the United States for human trafficking alone. Most sanctioned states are “pariah states” that are sanctioned for other reasons have experienced sanctioning under the TVPA<sup>12</sup>

Another innovation to the US Tier ratings in 2004, as mentioned above, was the addition of a new “watch list” of countries singled out for special scrutiny. Countries on this list are determined by the State Department to be performing worse in the current year than in previous years, or if not previously rated, to have a serious trafficking problem without taking adequate measures to address it.<sup>13</sup> Countries on the watch list are determined by the State Department to be performing poorly but are not in eminent danger of being sanctioned; however, being “watch listed” has a special stigma. It clearly indicates not performing to “expectation” and it implies enhanced monitoring through an additional mid-year interim assessment. Watch lists are social devices created not only to collect more information (for example, on suspected terrorists),<sup>14</sup> but also to create social sanctions (e.g., of firms suspected of insider trading)<sup>15</sup>, and in some cases to publicly shame and potentially deter various kinds of social and legal violations of community standards (countries suspected of human rights abuses).<sup>16</sup> In short, a watch list constitutes a “bright line” engineered to distinguish actors that are performing to social expectations and those that are not.

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<sup>12</sup> Countries that have been at least partially sanctioned include Equatorial Guinea, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Syria, North Korea, Myanmar, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Iran, Eritrea and Fiji.

<sup>13</sup> The exact criteria for inclusion on the watch list can be found in the Introduction of the 2004 Report, at <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/34021.htm>.

<sup>14</sup> See for example Interpol’s terrorism watch list at <http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2002/PR010>.

<sup>15</sup> See [http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/watch\\_list.asp#axzz24BH2gFh7](http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/watch_list.asp#axzz24BH2gFh7).

<sup>16</sup> Some of these “watch lists” may be unofficial, such as an annual speech given by a highly visible official. See for example news reports of a UN human rights “watch list” on which Canada was recently mentioned: <http://rt.com/news/canada-human-rights-watch-list-058/>.

Note that we are not claiming the tier rankings necessarily capture objective “truth.” Despite the effort to be systematic, they are hardly scientific; at a minimum they are highly subjective. Even U.S. officials have criticized the rankings as inconsistent and superficial (United States Government Accountability Office 2006, i, 33). But this admission supports rather than undermines our use of these rankings as exercises of social pressure.

Theoretically, this pressure could exert itself through a number of different mechanisms. First, the reports may exert a monitoring effect akin to the Hawthorne effect discussed above. In that case, scrutiny itself might account for an increased propensity to criminalize human trafficking. Furthermore, one of the strategies of the U.S. TIP report is to name and shame. The reports serve a monitoring function and expose “problem behaviors” that a focal country, the United States, has identified as falling below international standards.<sup>17</sup> This shaming effect may be particularly strong when states are viewed as crossing a “bright line” of socially acceptable behavior. The watch list is clearly a candidate for one such bright line.

This leads us to posit several hypotheses.

**Scrutiny Hypothesis:** *Countries not included in the US reporting system will be less likely to criminalize than countries included in the reporting system.*

We also expect there may be heightened embarrassment resulting from being watch-listed. We hypothesize this may be due to being listed per se (which is embarrassing), and not due to any significant differences between countries or the risk of actual sanction (which only occurs to countries rated 3.) The effect of being on the watch list is precisely to draw negative attention to the country. The most relevant comparison for this hypothesis is to compare those ranked 2 and 2.5. Thus:

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<sup>17</sup> The US TIP policy adheres closely, though not fully, to the 2000 TIP protocol. However, the US has been criticized for substituting its own trafficking definition and not applying more comprehensive HR standards in country assessments is problematic . See Chuang 2005-2006.

**Bright line hypothesis:** *After the Tier 2 Watch List was introduced in 2004, countries on the watch list will be more likely to criminalize than those ranked Tier 2, regardless of whether or how much economic aid they receive from the US.*

If there is a distinct shaming effect associated with falling below socially acceptable international norms and standards, then the embarrassment may be greatest the first time this happens to a country. The country may therefore be more likely to react to remedy this shaming immediately following the “demotion.” Thus:

**Demotion hypotheses:** *countries that have been recently demoted to the Tier 2 watch list will be more likely to criminalize than other countries.*

#### **IV. Empirical approach**

The US TIP policy promotes a wide range of policies, but many of them are difficult to assess systematically across countries. We have chosen a relatively objective dependent variable, namely, *whether countries criminalize human trafficking in their domestic legislation*. This is not only one of the main tenets of the UN protocol,<sup>18</sup> but it is also one of the foremost goals of the US policy.<sup>19</sup> A country is classified as having fully criminalized when it prohibits all forms of human trafficking, including sex and labor trafficking of both men and women, children and adults, and when the domestic law prescribes significant penalties for these crimes, which usually means minimum sentences of 3-5 years.

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<sup>18</sup>Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Article V Paragraphs 1 and 2 read: “1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences the conduct set forth in article 3 of this Protocol, when committed intentionally. 2. Each State Party shall also adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences...” Text at [http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final\\_documents\\_2/convention\\_%20traff\\_eng.pdf](http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf).

<sup>19</sup> See for example the policy statement by the Department of Justice at [http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/human\\_trafficking.htm](http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/human_trafficking.htm).



To test our hypotheses we generate a range of explanatory variables to capture the US's efforts to encourage countries to address human trafficking. The first variable is an indicator to denote whether a country is included in the report at all. As we discuss below, US TIP reports were not initially comprehensive. Fewer than half of all states were initially reviewed, but as of 2012 almost all are reviewed on a yearly basis. Our second variable is the country's rating itself: whether it is rated as a Tier 1, 2, or 3 country or placed on the watch list. We also generate a variable called "demotion" that is coded 1 in a year that a country is placed either on the watch list, or rated a Tier 3 (without first having been on the watch list) for the first time.

Since we are interested in scrutiny and shaming effects *net of the likelihood of any impending material sanctions*, we generate two sanctions variables. One is simply an indicator of whether a country had any level of sanction implemented against it. The other retains the levels for each type of sanctions. Thus countries with no sanctions are coded as 0, and countries with sanctions are coded as 1, 2 or 3, depending on the combination of sanctions imposed. We also generate an indicator that uses all the above information to determine whether a country was subject to an imminent sanctions threat. This indicator is one if a country was either on the watch list or was placed on Tier 3 but did not have sanctions imposed against it. Foreign aid is measured as total US assistance in constant 2010 dollars. We take the natural log of total aid to a country, after replacing all non-recipients with a small, but non-zero value.

We also include a number of control variables. Since human trafficking has a strong gendered element – many of the early UN resolutions addressing the problem related specifically to women and girls – it is possible that states that give women a stronger voice in governance are more likely to criminalize. We control for this possibility by including a measure of the *share of women in parliament*. In addition we include the Freedom House civil liberties measure, which

ranges from a best of 1 to a worst of 7, as well as a measure of corruption from the International Country Risk Guide ranging from 0 (very low corruption) to 6 (very high corruption). From the World Bank we also include the log of GDP. To test our arguments about the effects of scrutiny and shaming net of material impact via sanctions, we include a variable that captures the total economic assistance to a country from the US, excluding military aid.

We also attempt to control for the activities of other actors in the country or region. To this end we create a measure of how often the annual TIP report mentions the existence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and we then average this over the number of reports and use it as a fixed measure of the level of activities by NGOs in the country. We do the same thing for intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). We also control for the regional density of criminalization: the number of countries that have criminalized human trafficking as a proportion of the total number of countries in a region. Recognizing the possibility that ratification of the UN Protocol to suppress human trafficking may create compliance pressures, we control for whether or not a country has ratified that agreement. Finally, we include three measures of the intensity of the trafficking incidence in a country. These capture the extent to which a country is an origin, destination or transit country. These are based on UN assessments published in 2006,<sup>20</sup> and they take a fixed value for each country throughout the period. A list of all variables and sources can be found in the appendix.

Because we are interested in a unidirectional event that occurs only once in our dataset, we use a cox proportional hazards model to analyze the probability that a country will criminalize, given that it has not already done so. We use lags of all the explanatory and control variables to help address reverse causality and selection issues, something we also address further after discussing the main results. We analyze all countries for which data are available

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<sup>20</sup> From the 2006 UNODC TIP report, Appendix 3: Incidence of Reporting of Origin Countries.

between 2000 (one year before the first TIP report) and 2011. Because sanctions are only possible in US law after 2003, in models testing hypotheses about sanctions the sample is restricted to years after 2003. Subsequently, our models include between 121 and 160 countries.

## **V. Findings**

### *The scrutiny effect*

As shown in Table 1, we find considerable support for the scrutiny hypothesis. Compared to countries in the report, “unrated” states – those not included in the reporting system – are significantly less likely to criminalize trafficking. The substantive effect is considerable. Countries excluded from scrutiny are between 74-83% less likely to criminalize than are countries included in the report in any given year in which they have not already done so. Notably, the claim here is not that countries criminalize because they are getting a bad rating. Rather, they act because their practices are under scrutiny by the United States, and will soon be made public to the rest of the world.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Of course, domestic factors influence criminalization as well. Model 1 suggests that greater representation of women in a country’s parliament increases the chances that they will criminalize human trafficking. Every percent increase in female parliamentary representation increases the chances of criminalization by about 1.7% (model 1). Better civil liberties are associated with criminalization: every increase on the well-known Freedom House Civil Liberties scale (on which higher numbers indicate worse practices) reduces the chances of

criminalization by about 18-23% (models 1 and 2). Corruption is also associated with criminalization.

We investigated several external influences on criminalization as well. Interestingly, we found that the scrutiny effect is robust to inclusion of the ratification of the 2000 Human Trafficking Protocol, which itself increases the likelihood of criminalization by between 68% (model 1) and over 200 % (model 2). Criminalization is positively associated with the density of criminalization in the region as well, although as a control variable we do not investigate the nature of this “regional effect” in any detail. None of the other controls included contribute much to the model. For example, there is no evidence that countries the UN has found to have high incidence of trafficking activity – whether as a country or origin, destination or transit – has a systematic effect on criminalization. In addition, we found that the effect of scrutiny is also robust to the inclusion of an EU indicator variable, share of a country’s trade with both the US and the EU, and log of GDP (results for these variables available upon request). Similarly, the model is robust to the inclusion of a control of bureaucratic quality; however, this is not significant. Information availability (see later discussion of endogeneity and selection) does appear correlated with criminalization, at least in model 1. However, even when controlling for the availability of information, being rated by the U.S. increases the likelihood of criminalization in the following year. Notably, the scrutiny effect is not simply capturing momentum in the early years after the passage of the UN TIP protocol: the scrutiny effect is robust when we exclude up to the first four years of the reports (2001 to 2005) when few states had criminalized and many were necessarily missing, and when we eliminate countries that are consistently rated “1” and/or consistently rated “3.” Furthermore, it is also robust to controls for countries on the watch list and those rated tier 3, showing that the effect remains even when the comparison group is

countries in the report that are not shamed, but simply rated 1 or 2. The evidence overall is consistent with the hypothesis that scrutiny *per se* contributes to changes in state policy.

### *Shaming*

We also find support for shaming in the bright line and the demotion hypotheses. This bright line hypothesis is examined in Models 1 and 2 in Table 2. These results clearly show a significant difference between Tier 2, which is the omitted category, and the Watch List (controlling for Tier 1 and Tier 3). Countries on the watch list are more than 2.5 times more likely to criminalize than countries rated at Tier 2, and Tier 3 countries are estimated to be more than four times more likely to do so. The model is quite robust to the inclusion of all the control variables discussed earlier, as well as to log of population, number of TIP-related NGOs working in the country, number of TIP-related IGOs working in the country, and log of US economic assistance to the country. Furthermore, because the watch list is first used in the 2004 report, we also tested to see if the findings of the model hold if restricted to the years after 2003. They do, and quite strongly so, always remaining statistically significant even below the .01 percent level. We also narrowed the heterogeneity of the sample by dropping all countries that were consistently rated “1” and/or “3”, thus focusing *only* on those countries in the mid-range of the ratings. The bright line hypothesis is very robust to this subset of countries that might have “gone either way” when it comes to the watch-list.

Finally, in terms of shaming, the demotion hypothesis also finds support. Models 3 and 4 include three different lags for when a country first drops to the watch list. The model suggests that a first-time drop galvanizes action within two to three years, and nearly doubles the likelihood of criminalization. Action may be delayed a year or two, but it does seem to be more

likely to follow in the wake of a tier rating demotion than in the absence of one. Again, the demotion model is robust to all the aforementioned control variables.

*Are the effects really about aid?*

The models are robust to the inclusion of a measure of the log of the level of US economic assistance to a country. Nevertheless, it may be that the effect of information via scrutiny or shaming is simply because this pressure interacts with US assistance. To address this we examine whether the scrutiny and shaming effects matter *independently* of a country's US aid level. This is important because we are more likely to see the "pure" effects of social pressure when material pressures are likely to be very low. The first model in Table 3 examines whether unrated countries are less likely to criminalize trafficking even after inclusion of an interaction effect with US economic assistance. The level of aid affects neither criminalization nor the effect of scrutiny on criminalization. Importantly, in and of itself, inclusion in the report is associated with criminalization – countries excluded are about  $\frac{3}{4}$  less likely to criminalize<sup>21</sup> –, suggesting that the scrutiny effect is not merely an artifact of economic assistance from the US. The remaining models in Table 3 examine whether being on the watch list or on Tier 3 has any effect *independent* of a country's US aid level. All these models use interaction terms between the Tier status of a country and the level of aid from the US. In Models 2-3, we see that countries that are on the Watch List OR Tier 3 but receive no U.S. economic assistance are about two times more likely to criminalize than countries rated Tier 1 or Tier 2. Models 4 and 5 control for a sanctions waiver (for a country otherwise at risk of sanctioning) interacted with aid status. Even if a country is not likely to suffer a material hit – whether because they receive no US aid or because

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<sup>21</sup> That is, "Unrated" (line 1, model 1).

sanctions have explicitly been waived<sup>22</sup> – they are twice as likely to criminalize if they are below the bright line (on the watch list or Tier 3). There is also a positive interaction between shaming and U.S. aid levels,<sup>23</sup> but it is intriguing that shaming seems to matter even when countries receive no material aid from the U.S. Indeed, when we look only at the years in which there was no US sanctioning program at all – and hence no country was at material risk – there is an estimated 430% increase in the probability of criminalization the year after the shame of a tier 3 rating.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, our previous results on scrutiny, women in parliament and civil liberties are all robust to controls for U.S. aid.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

#### *Endogeneity and selection concerns*

Another potential threat to our inference that scrutiny and shaming effects have a causal effect on human trafficking criminalization is the objection that such treatment is strategic. Some may argue that the U.S. strategically selects countries to scrutinize and to shame that the state Department *anticipates* can be influenced by diplomatic pressure. In this view, the US could be motivated to make the TIP reporting system as a whole appear “successful.”

For several reasons, this selection logic seems highly implausible. Selection into the report itself is apparently permanent; once countries are included they are not removed, which limits the strategic use of scrutiny. Furthermore, the State Department has discussed in detail its rationale for inclusion in their “methodology” section of each report. They are clear that one

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<sup>22</sup> That is, “watch List OR tier 3” (line 4, models 2 and 3) and “watch list OR tier 3 with waiver” (line 6, models 4 and 5).

<sup>23</sup> That is, the interaction term in line 5 (models 2 and 3) and line 5 (models 4 and 5).

<sup>24</sup> Controlling for civil liberties, women in parliament, ratification of the 2000 human trafficking protocol, log of population and missing information. Full results available from authors.

criterion is sufficient information to warrant a report, and another is evidence of at least 100 cases of trafficking reported (this threshold was lifted in 2009, when the decision was made to include all countries)<sup>25</sup>. Finally, there is little to no empirical support for the idea that the U.S. strategically selects its TIP report coverage to ensure “success.” Were this the case, the US might choose to report on countries who are embedded in large numbers of IGOs, or to report on “friendly” nations they thought they might be able to influence. However, number of IGOs, extent of trade with the US, and foreign policy “affinity” with the U.S. do not predict inclusion. We also did not find that the US was disproportionately including countries in the report that were more likely to criminalize trafficking in the first place, such as those with more representation of women in parliament, democracies, and those with better respect for rule of law. If anything, the opposite seems to be true for democracies and rule of law states.<sup>26</sup> The only indicator of potential influence that might suggest more leverage was the level of economic assistance (logged and lagged) from the U.S. More assistance tends to be associated with a greater likelihood of being in the report, but then again, this could also be because the US collects more data on countries to which it gives aid. In either case, we have controlled throughout for the effect of aid.

At first blush, it appears that countries that ratify the 2000 human trafficking protocol are more likely to be in the report, but a close look at the timing of ratification actually reveals that states are more likely to ratify the protocol *after* they have been scrutinized, and not before. Of the 565 pre-ratification country-years included in a U.S. TIP report, the ratification rate was about 16 per cent, while the corresponding rate for 585 unreported country-year was half that, at

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<sup>25</sup> Note that after 2005 countries with insufficient information were included as special cases, but these were not rated.

<sup>26</sup> In some models democracy and rule of law became significant, but in these models the direction of the predicted effect was opposite what would have favored criminalization: less democratic countries and lower rule of law was associated with inclusion in the report.



about 8 per cent. In other words, it appears that scrutiny may also encourage ratification (something the U.S. strongly supports) but that selection into the report is not biased by the act of ratifying the protocol.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, none of the 76 countries included in the first 2001 report had ratified the protocol for the simple reason that it had only just been signed the year before.

Selection into the report seems to be driven by the very factors the State Department says influences their coverage: sufficient information to make the determination that there is at least some trafficking going on within or through the jurisdiction. For countries on which trafficking data exists, incidence of trafficking clearly matters. A simple logit model of inclusion in the report controlling for prior year inclusion revealed that the incidence of trafficking in origin, transit and destination countries (the same control variables included in Table 1, Model 2) was strongly positively correlated with inclusion.

Further consistent with US claims about the criteria for inclusion in the report, *unrelated to criminalization*, we also found that countries that are less likely to have information – *of many different kinds* – were also far less likely to be in the report. We created a variable for information availability that counts how often a country has missing information on eight variables in a given year.<sup>28</sup> This missing information variable consistently predicted inclusion in the report. Larger countries, that might provide better data, were also more likely to be in the report.<sup>29</sup> As seen in Table 1, the scrutiny models are robust to inclusion both population size and information availability.

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<sup>27</sup> Cross tabulation table available from authors upon request.

<sup>28</sup> The variables are the UN incidence data on TIP, the Freedom House civil liberties, the International Country Risk Guide corruption score, Erik Voeten's UN Affinity voting data, and four variables from the World Bank: Net ODA, Intentional homicides, Health expenditures, and GDP. This variable thus ranging from 0-8, therefore measures how likely it is that data is available on a given country in a given year on a mix of general and more specific variables that may related to how good a country is at providing data in general on domestic issues.

<sup>29</sup> Full results are available from authors upon request.

The above analysis suggests that both missing information and the log of GDP might be credible instruments to control for reporting endogeneity. They explain selection into the report, but there is neither theoretical reason nor empirical evidence to suggest they are correlated with criminalization. Using these instruments, we ran some very simple regressions, instrumenting *inclusion in the report*. Table 4 presents the results for the yearly coefficients on a series of instrumental variable regression models by year.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Model 1 lists the coefficients by year for a model of criminalization in year  $t$  that included simply the freedom house civil liberties level and inclusion in the TIP report ( $t-1$ ), instrumented using log of GDP and the missing information variable. Model 2 includes a measure of share of women in parliament.<sup>30</sup> Controlling for endogenous selection into the report, the first specification suggests that scrutiny increases the likelihood of criminalization by between 66% (model 1) and about 42% (model 2) for the first year after the report (2002). Inclusion in the report has a strong positive effect on criminalization until somewhere between 2007 and 2009, after which domestic variables, such as the share of women in parliament have much greater effect. It is hardly surprising, of course, that the scrutiny effect would wane once practically *all* states are scrutinized.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> We also tested whether Model 2 was robust to the inclusion of a number of other variables that might predict criminalization, such as levels of corruption, Freedom House Civil Liberties, rule of law and ratification of the UN TIP protocol. With the exception of civil liberties, these were generally not significant and did not change the results.

<sup>31</sup> When country years are pooled and a lagged dependent variable is included, the effect of the instrumented variable is somewhat sensitive to the lag structure of the instruments. Results are available from the authors on request.

Overall, whether or not we model selection into the U.S. TIP report, the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that scrutiny alone contributes to policy change to criminalize human trafficking. We doubt that the US is trying to report on countries that are on the verge of criminalizing anyway. In the very first round of the report in 2001 included countries such as Burma, Kyrgyzstan, and China. Iran joins the following year. Certainly, if the State Department is trying to game which countries are about to criminalize, it gets it wrong often. Many countries have been in the report for years and have still not fully criminalized: Benin, Bangladesh, the Ivory Coast, Cuba, and Honduras, to name just a few.

We can think of strategic shaming by use of the watch list in similar terms. The main thing to note is that it is implausible. Not only does it assume the US can predict which countries are on the verge of criminalizing human trafficking, it would certainly be counter-productive for the U.S. to watch list those on the verge of improving. It would quickly undermine the whole enterprise when it became apparent that countries would essentially get downgraded for taken any kind of initiative against human trafficking. Moreover, an examination finds many countries that are *not* shamed before they criminalize, which also supports an argument that the State Department is not primarily shaming countries strategically. For example, Australia entered the report in 2004 as a tier 1 and stayed there until it criminalized fully in 2006. Austria entered in 2001 as a tier 1 and stayed there until it criminalized in 2004. Chile entered in 2004 as a tier 2 and stayed there although it did not criminalize until 2011. There was no effort to drop Chile to the watch list right before it criminalized. Evidence of shaming such low hanging fruit is practically non-existent.<sup>32</sup> Thus, once again, the problem is unlikely to be one of reversed

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<sup>32</sup> That said the State Department does sometimes use shaming increase pressure on some countries whose criminalization effort has stalled. Thus, in Jordan its clear that the US did drop the country to the watch list because it wanted to pressure it to finish its legal process to criminalize, which had been underway for some time, but not progressed. Still, such cases are not the norm.

causality, or endogeneity. The State Department's choice of shaming behavior does not appear to be driven by its expectations of near term criminalization behavior.

Nor is there any systematic statistical evidence that the U.S. is strategically selecting easy-to-influence states through its assignment onto the watch list. The analysis in Table 5 suggests that the countries more likely to appear on the watch list are *not* those that one might think most likely to criminalize anyway, in the absence of pressure. Countries are more likely to appear on the watch list if they are *less* democratic, and the number of NGOs working in the country on TIP issues or IGOs affiliations – networks that the literature emphasizes are conducive to socialization – do not matter. Nor does it seem that the US strategically shames those states over which it may have more leverage. Countries that vote more often with the US in the UN Assembly are *less* likely to be shamed and the level of economic assistance from the US does not matter. It seems that the US is more likely to shield its friends than to exploit its potential leverage over them. Indeed, it seems that being put on the watch list may indeed, as the US claims, have at least something to do with performance. For example, countries that do worse in protecting trafficked victims are more likely to be shamed by being put on the watch list.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

As with inclusion into the report, these findings suggest there may be a way usefully to instrument for the bright line effect by using instruments to account for the endogenous factors that account for shaming but do not influence criminalization. To do so, we eliminate the countries that make significant effort (Tier 1) and those that make very little effort to control trafficking (Tier 3). In other words, if we limit the analysis only to countries that are

approximately similar in their efforts, and potentially could have been rated either way, what explains the placement of some at the reasonably respectable Tier 2 and others below the bright line – on the watch list?

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Table 6 reports our efforts to endogenize placement on the watch list from among “plausible” candidates (Tier 2 and actual watch listed countries), using U.N. voting affinity scores and victim protection policies as instruments for watch list inclusion. There are too few observations to do a test year by year. However, when yearly observations are pooled and analyzed with an instrumental variable regression model, and controlling for factors that explain watch-listing itself, being watch listed increases the chances of criminalizing in the following year by about 18% (model 1). The IV probit model generally confirms this finding (model 2). There are strong reasons to think that inclusion on the watch-list among this large group of mid-level anti-trafficking performers shames their governments and contributes to criminalization the next year.

## **VI. Conclusions and Recommendations**

This research has focused primarily on the criminalization of human trafficking in domestic law; as such we have not directly addressed the question of whether coercion can coax serious efforts in the area of law enforcement, much less in the fair and efficient administration of justice or the proper treatment of the victims of human trafficking. What we have done is to examine the effectiveness of various US strategies in encouraging other countries to criminalize.

Overall, we find the US TIP policy to be an effective tool in achieving this limited goal. Indeed, it appears that having a monitoring system like this has value in and of itself. Merely being included in the report motivates countries to criminalize human trafficking. This scrutiny effect has been under-investigated in international relations. It says something profound about the influence of information and knowledge – and of the implicit social pressure of being observed – that few have acknowledged in international affairs. This is a crucial finding that warrants more research, especially giving the exponential growth in global information collection and dissemination in the electronic age.

Furthermore, when examining the different strategies towards countries in the report, we find strong support for the effectiveness of social pressure. It appears that countries react strongly to social shaming, that they react in particular to falling below a certain socially acceptable threshold, and that they are most likely to criminalize when they first experience a drop below this threshold. Thus, placing a country on the watch list for the first time can be a powerful tool. This finding speaks in particular to the focal character of certain bright lines in international relations. Further research should not only investigate the properties of such lines, it should also investigate the conditions that make such notional demarcations more or less powerful. Here we have investigated a unilaterally determined watch list; it is reasonable to ask whether the power of such a designation would be even greater were that line to be socially rather than unilaterally determined.

The central message of this paper is the importance of social pressure controlling for the existence of material threats, potential and actual. We found that countries receiving US aid are not more likely to criminalize – indeed the more US aid a country gets, the less likely it is to criminalize trafficking. This trend changes, however, under pressure of a low tier rating. In that

case the more US aid a country receives, the more likely it appears to be to criminalize. Finally, we find that countries receiving more encouraging treatment such as receiving waivers or being praised for good behavior are more likely to criminalize, but there is no such statistically significant effect for those sanctioned outright. Furthermore our models allowed us to consider the effects of shaming when US material assistance is effectively zero; such effects were still considerable.

Our findings about non-material social pressure are important because few countries experience real aid reductions as a consequence of the TIP policy; only about half of sanctioned countries actually lose some aid the following year. Most of these countries are already in disfavor with the US, so in reality very little is at stake materially. That is hardly the end of the story, however. Scrutiny and shaming are policy options that may be more effective than non-credible threats to withhold aid. And because the sting of social stigma directed at a government cannot be externalized to its people, we feel warranted in calling for more research on the impact of scrutiny and shaming on policy choices worldwide.

These findings clearly warrant some caution given the challenging of working with behavioral data and modeling the selection issues. That said, they are quite interesting: They present support for scrutiny and social pressure per se, as well as the interaction of these with material threats. Furthermore, the findings add some nuance to theories of shaming. The unique rating feature of the TIP policy allows us to show for the first time that there may be threshold and demotion effects of shaming. Importantly, we have forwarded a new argument, namely that the monitoring system itself may matter, as countries omitted from the reporting system clearly lag behind those included.

**Table 1: Scrutiny Hypothesis**

Duration models of time to criminalization

Hazard Ratios, Robust standard errors in parentheses

	<b>Model 1.1</b>	<b>Model 1.2</b>	<b>Model 1.3</b>	<b>Model 1.4</b>
Unrated	0.258*** (0.0992)	0.321* (0.198)	0.152* (0.153)	0.171* (0.174)
Share of women in parliament	1.017** (0.00784)	1.011 (0.0117)	1.004 (0.0153)	1.005 (0.0151)
Freedom House Civil Liberties	0.769*** (0.0449)	0.824* (0.0860)	1.035 (0.134)	0.965 (0.121)
Regional density of criminalization	2.044e+99*** (6.561e+100)	1.456e+113*** (6.826e+114)	2.47e-08 (2.66e-06)	1.173e+28 (1.126e+30)
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification	1.687** (0.363)	2.127** (0.625)	3.007*** (1.178)	2.947*** (1.124)
Information availability (t-2)	1.246** (0.135)	1.036 (0.180)	0.886 (0.166)	0.875 (0.165)
Trafficking intensity in countries of origin		0.995 (0.100)	1.114 (0.147)	0.998 (0.121)
Trafficking intensity in transit countries		1.120 (0.131)	1.150 (0.141)	1.177 (0.145)
Trafficking intensity in destination countries		1.043 (0.120)	0.982 (0.128)	1.007 (0.135)
Corruption		1.252* (0.149)	1.143 (0.188)	1.187 (0.185)
Log US economic assistance			1.127 (0.0850)	1.054 (0.0751)
Average NGOs			1.130 (0.107)	1.073 (0.104)
Average IGOs			0.942 (0.184)	0.824 (0.165)
Log GDP per capita			1.234 (0.169)	
Log of total population			0.853 (0.0959)	
GDP per capita				0.973 (0.0848)
Number of countries	160	121	106	106
Number of criminalizations	107	78	59	59
Observations	1,403	1,049	881	881

Note: Unless otherwise noted, all explanatory variables are lagged

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Years included: 2000-2011. Note: Model 1 is robust to restriction of start year until 2005. The scrutiny model is also robust to inclusion of several control variables: trade with the US, and EU indicator variable, and voting affinity with the US in the UN general assembly. It is also robust



to exclusion of countries that are consistently rated either tier 1 or tier 3. Furthermore, it is robust to controls for countries on the watch list and those rated tier 3, showing that the effect remains even when the comparison group is countries in the report that are not shamed, but simply rated 1 or 2.

**Table 2: Shaming hypotheses**

Duration models of time to criminalization

Hazard Ratios, Robust standard errors in parentheses

	<b>Model 2.1</b>	<b>Model 2.2</b>	<b>Model 2.3</b>	<b>Model 2.4</b>
Watch List	2.593*** (0.589)	3.182*** (0.947)		
Tier 3	4.241*** (1.271)	4.214*** (1.640)		
First demotion to Watch list (t-3)			2.226** (0.694)	1.748 (0.756)
First demotion to Watch list (t-2)			1.858** (0.520)	2.059** (0.723)
First demotion to Watch list (t-1)			1.344 (0.338)	1.695 (0.552)
Unrated	0.513 (0.220)	0.484 (0.305)	0.333*** (0.132)	0.361* (0.220)
Tier 1	2.271*** (0.699)	1.929* (0.708)		
Share of women in parliament	1.019** (0.00880)	1.010 (0.0119)	1.021** (0.00824)	1.014 (0.0121)
Freedom House Civil Liberties	0.751*** (0.0503)	0.748*** (0.0797)	0.764*** (0.0461)	0.801** (0.0842)
Regional density of criminalization	86.11*** (75.00)	1.437 (0)	148.2 (0)	138.3 (0)
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification	1.765** (0.402)	2.090** (0.652)	1.515* (0.348)	1.989** (0.635)
Corruption		1.294** (0.152)		1.288** (0.152)
Trafficking intensity in countries of origin		1.062 (0.0972)		1.005 (0.101)
Trafficking intensity in transit countries		1.092 (0.119)		1.143 (0.129)
Trafficking intensity in destination countries		0.982 (0.107)		1.023 (0.120)
Number of countries	160	121	160	121
Number of criminalizations	107	78	107	78
Observations	1,392	1,038	1,392	1,038

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

*Note:* Unless otherwise noted, all explanatory variables are lagged.

Years included: 2000-2011. The basic bright line model is robust to exclusion of 2001-2003.

The model is also robust to inclusion of several control variables: log of population, number of TIP-related NGOs working in the country, number of TIP-related IGOs working in the country,

log of US economic assistance to the country, trade with the US, and voting affinity with the US in the UN general assembly. The bright line model is also robust to exclusion of countries that are consistently rated either tier 1 or tier 3.

The basic demotion model is also robust to exclusion of 2001-2003. The model is also robust to inclusion of several control variables: log of population, number of TIP-related NGOs working in the country, number of TIP-related IGOs working in the country, log of US economic assistance to the country, trade with the US, and voting affinity with the US in the UN general assembly. The bright line model is also robust to exclusion of countries that are consistently rated either tier 1 or tier 3. Inclusion of several of these variables or checks shifts the significance from the First demotion to Watch list (t-3) to the (t-1) variable. In some cases the results are stronger.

**Table 3: Robustness to aid influence: Shaming versus the risk of sanctions?**

Duration models of time to criminalization

Hazard Ratios, Robust standard errors in parentheses

	<b>Model 3.1</b>	<b>Model 3.2</b>	<b>Model 3.3</b>	<b>Model 3.4</b>	<b>Model 3.5</b>
Unrated	0.273** (0.162)				
Unrated* Log of US aid	.918 (0.075)				
Log of US aid	0.962 (0.394)	0.892*** (0.0313)	0.922** (0.0354)	0.888*** (0.0308)	0.916** (0.0346)
Watch list OR tier 3		1.843** (0.466)	2.208*** (0.620)		
“Watch list OR tier 3” * Log of US aid		1.175** (0.0777)	1.142* (0.0783)		
Watch list OR tier 3 with waiver				1.723** (0.452)	2.043** (0.590)
“Watch list OR tier 3 with waiver” * Log of US aid				1.206*** (0.0819)	1.174** (0.0826)
Sanction indicator				2.330 (1.518)	2.647 (1.720)
Unrated		0.226*** (0.122)	0.303** (0.170)	0.221*** (0.120)	0.294** (0.165)
Tier 1			2.304** (0.866)		2.253** (0.840)
Share of women in parliament	1.009 (0.011)	1.018** (0.00833)	1.017** (0.00844)	1.018** (0.00844)	1.017* (0.00860)
Freedom House Civil Liberties	0.831 (0.083)	0.813*** (0.0641)	0.825** (0.0666)	0.814** (0.0663)	0.827** (0.0689)
Regional density of criminalization		6.255e+97 (0)	3.287e+134 (0)	6.372e+108 (0)	4.078e+131 (0)
2000 TIP Protocol Ratification	2.255*** (0.664)	1.599** (0.375)	1.646** (0.388)	1.592* (0.380)	1.642** (0.394)
Log of GDP		0.903* (0.0479)	0.885** (0.0487)	0.901* (0.0480)	0.883** (0.0489)
NGO density		1.059 (0.0805)	1.059 (0.0810)	1.055 (0.0803)	1.054 (0.0807)
IGO density		0.804 (0.130)	0.815 (0.130)	0.809 (0.131)	0.820 (0.130)

Information availability	1.012 (0.167)				
TIP Intensity variables	Yes	No <sup>#</sup>	No <sup>#</sup>	No <sup>#</sup>	No <sup>#</sup>
Number of countries	122	137	137	137	137
# of criminalizations	78	85	85	85	85
Observations	1051	776	776	776	776

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

*Note: All explanatory variables are lagged.* Model 1 includes years 2000-2011. The other models are restricted to years after 2003 when sanctions were possible. <sup>#</sup> The intensity of trafficking variables were not included, but when they are they are not significant and the models are robust to their inclusion.

Robustness checks: In this model, the independent effect of US pressure on criminalization is robust to inclusion of log of population, trade with the US, and voting affinity with the US in the UN general assembly. We also specified models that accounted for whether a country received a waiver through on a presidential determination based on “good behavior” or a presidential determination for other reasons. Even when accounting for these different possible explanations for the waivers, countries that were shamed through US pressure (watch list countries and countries that received any kind of tier 3 waiver) were still statistically more likely to criminalize.

Further to the point of the shaming mechanisms, note also that the shaming variable is significant even if the model is restricted to years pre-2004 when sanctions were not possible.

**Table 4: Determinants of criminalization, by year**  
**Coefficients on the instrument for inclusion in report in year t-1 (robust standard errors)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Model 4.1</b>	<b>Model 4.2</b>
2002	0.666*** (.256)	0.416** (.191)
2003	0.916*** (.306)	0.456** (.227)
2004	1.297*** (.409)	0.881*** (.329)
2005	1.061** (.442)	0.560 (.420)
2006	1.314** (.523)	0.684* (.413)
2007	1.406** (.628)	0.759 (.541)
2008	1.317* (.727)	0.453 (.615)
2009	.601 (.528)	.099 (.481)
2010	1.415 (1.607)	-.771 (1.085)
2011	.283 (2.155)	-2.598 (2.593)

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Instrumented: inclusion in the report (t-1)

Instruments: missing information (t-2) and log of GDP (t-2), plus controls listed below.

Model 1: No controls

Model 2: Controls for women in parliament, Freedom House Civil Liberties and ratification of the TIP protocol. The Freedom House Civil Liberties is always significant and ratification of the TIP protocol is usually, but not always significant. Note than in the early years scrutiny by being in the report is important, but in the later years this fades away and women in parliament becomes highly significant in 2008 and later.

**Table 5: Results of logit and regression models comparing explanations for selection onto the watch list with criminalization**

**Logit coefficients; robust standard errors clustered by country**

	Selection onto watch list			Criminalization		<i>First year of criminalization</i>
	Logit model odds ratio	Logit model odds ratio	Regression coefficients	Logit model odds ratio	Logit model odds ratio	Regression coefficients
Watch list (t-1)	4.124*** (0.748)	4.241*** (0.790)	0.310*** (0.0399)			
Criminalization (t-1)				18.44*** (4.278)		
Affinity score (t-1)	0.217** (0.141)	0.263** (0.154)	-0.171** (0.0832)	2.029 (2.300)	0.988 (0.720)	-0.000351 (0.0566)
Victim protection policy score (t-1)	0.569*** (0.0649)	0.577*** (0.0639)	-0.0979*** (0.0185)	0.872 (0.147)	0.804 (0.114)	-0.0168 (0.0110)
Civil liberties (t-1)	1.195*** (0.0806)	1.181** (0.0789)	0.0319** (0.0123)	0.962 (0.0959)	0.982 (0.0831)	-0.00138 (0.00663)
Log GDP (t-1)	1.046 (0.0506)					
Log US economic assistance (t-1)	0.975 (0.0308)					
Average NGOs	1.084 (0.0794)					
Average IGOs	1.133 (0.155)					
Constant	0.228 (0.283)	0.850 (0.374)	0.417*** (0.0813)	0.205** (0.147)	0.174*** (0.106)	0.134*** (0.0488)
Observations	786	793	793	782	782	782
R-squared			0.181			0.002

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Includes only countries rated Tier 2, or Watch List.

**Table 6: Determinants of first year of criminalization, by year**  
**Coefficients on the instrument for inclusion on the watch list, t-1 (robust standard errors)**

Explanatory variables:	Model 6.1 Instrumental variable regression	Model 6.2 Instrumental variable probit
Watch list (t-1)	0.183* (0.0927)	1.217** (0.605)
Active women (t-1)	0.000434* (0.000234)	0.00302** (0.00151)
Average IGOs	-0.0217** (0.0105)	-0.130 (0.0864)
Constant	0.0328 (0.0257)	-1.737*** (0.135)
Observations	781	687
R-squared	0.020	

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Model includes only countries rated Tier 1 or on the watch list.

Instrumented: inclusion on the watch list (t-1)

Instruments: affinity score (t-1) and victim protection score (t-1), plus controls.

The IV regression is robust to the inclusion of a lagged DV.



## Data Appendix

### Dependent Variable:

*Full Criminalization:* the complete prohibition of all forms of human trafficking, including sex and labor trafficking for men and women, children and adults. Penalties must be significant, usually meaning minimum sentences of 3-5 years. Source: UN global report on trafficking, 2009. US TIP reports, domestic legislation from the International Organization of Migration (IOM) database and other sources. Note that, because the US trafficking report comes out annually in June, to avoid sequencing errors in our inference, a country is coded as having fully criminalized in a given year only if it had done so prior to the issuance of the report in June. Dates usually refer to the actual enactment of the legislation, but in cases where that information is not available, the month of passage of the legislation is used. If no date could be established, the country was coded as having fully criminalized that year (equivalent to an assumption that it criminalized before the report came out, thus biasing any systematic error against a finding of an effect of the report on criminalization).

### US policy related variables:

*Unrated:* Dichotomous variable indicating whether a country is excluded from the report.

*Tier 1:* Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating whether the US has rated a country as Tier 1, which means that the US has assessed it to fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA) minimum standards.

*Tier 2:* Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating whether the US has rated a country as Tier 2, which means that the US has assessed that it does not fully comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act's (TVPA) minimum standards, but is making efforts to do so.

*Tier 2 watch list:* Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating whether the US has placed a country on the Tier 2 watch list, which means that it may drop to Tier 3 the following year.

*Tier 3:* Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating whether the US has rated a country as Tier 3, which means the US has assessed that it does not fully comply with the minimum standards and is not making significant efforts to do so.

*Sanctions indicator:* A simple 0/1 indicator of whether a country received any sanction that was not subsequently waived by the US president according to Section 110 (d) of the United States Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.<sup>33</sup>

*Waiver:* Dichotomous variable (0/1) indicating whether the US has issued a waiver for all three types of possible sanctions under Section 110 (d) of the United States Victims of Trafficking and

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33 <http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/61124.htm>

Violence Protection Act of 2000. The president has the ability under Section 110(c) to determine that for reasons for national interest or existing hardships within a country, not to implement the sanctions. Thus, the full waiver variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the country is a Tier 3, but receives a full waiver under all of the above applicable provisions of the act for any of these reasons.

*Consideration for good behavior:* An indicator of whether the US president determines that the country can be treated essentially as not being a Tier 3 country because it has shown good will or progress since the report was issued. Under section 110(d)(3) of the TVPA, the president can determine that a Tier 3 country “has come into compliance with the minimum standards or is making significant efforts to bring itself into compliance.” In such a case, the sanctions will not be implemented. The variable for good behavior is an indicator (0/1) for whether a country falls under this provision. This variable is only used in robustness checks that are not shown in the paper.

*Demotion:* An indicator coded 1 in a year that a country is placed either on the watch list or rated a Tier 3 (without first having been on the watch list) for the first time.

*Log of US aid:* The log of Total Economic Assistance from the United States. Obligations in millions, constant 2010 \$US. Source: US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook]

#### **Other variables:**

*Civil Liberties:* Freedom House Civil Liberties; 1 to 7 scale, with 1 representing the best civil liberties and 7 the worst. We extended the 2010 data to 2011. Source: Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports>, accessed February 2012.

*Bureaucratic Quality:* from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), ranging from 0-4, with 4 indicating the highest quality. For information on the ICRG, see [www.prsgroup.com](http://www.prsgroup.com)

*Corruption:* the International Country Risk Guide, ranging from 0-6, with 6 indicating no corruption.

*Share of women in parliament:* Share of voting seats in the lower house of national parliaments held by women (% of total seats), as of the last day of the listed year. Source: Women in National Parliaments, statistical archive. <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif-arc.htm>, accessed February 2012.

*Trade with the US:* Share of a country's total trade (imports plus exports) that is with the United States. Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.

*HT incidence destination:* Incidence of reporting of trafficking persons in destination countries. 1=very low; 2=low; 3=medium; 4=high; 5=very high. Source: 2006 UNODC TIP report, Appendix 5-Incidence of reporting of destination countries. The incidence from the 2006 report is extended to all years in the analysis.

*HT incidence origin:* Incidence of reporting of trafficking persons in countries of origin. 1=very low; 2=low; 3=medium; 4=high; 5=very high. Source: 2006 UNODC TIP report, Appendix 3- Incidence of reporting of origin countries. The incidence from the 2006 report is extended to all years in the analysis.

*HT incidence transit:* Incidence of reporting of trafficking persons in transit countries. 1=very low; 2=low; 3=medium; 4=high; 5=very high. Source: 2006 UNODC TIP report, Appendix 4- Incidence of reporting of transit countries. The incidence from the 2006 report is extended to all years in the analysis.

*Regional density of criminalization:* A measure capturing the percent of countries in a region that have criminalized trafficking

*Log of GPD:* From the World Bank Indicators, Current US Dollars.

*Log of Total Population:* From the World Bank Indicators.

*UN Affinity:* from Eric Voeten. We use the agree2un variable, which measures how often a country votes with the US in the UN General Assembly. The variable ranges from 0-1.

*2000 TIP Protocol Ratification:* An indicator (0/1) for whether a country has ratified the UN Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

*NGO density:* A count of number of total times the annual US State Department TIP report for a given country mentions the word NGO, divided by the number of reports in the data. Thus, it captures average number of NGO mentions per report for a given country and it is a constant for each country. The data is extended backwards to years before a country was included in the report.

*IGO density:* Analogous to NGO density, only counting mentions of the following specific IGOs: ILO, IOM, OSCE, UNICEF, Council of Europe, UNHCR, UNIFEM and UNDP.

*Information availability:* We created a variable that counts how often a country has missing information on eight variables in a given year. The variables are the UN incidence data on TIP, the Freedom House civil liberties, the International Country Risk Guide corruption score, Erik Voeten's UN Affinity voting data, and four variables from the World Bank: Net ODA, Intentional homicides, Health expenditures, and GDP. This variable thus ranging from 0-8, therefore measures how likely it is that data is available on a given country in a given year on a mix of variables that may relate to how good a country is at providing data in general on domestic issues. In the scrutiny model this variable is lagged by two years, because we are including it to control for whether information availability determined inclusion in the report in year t-1.



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