## Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics

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| Power-Wielders Regarded as | Who Is Entitled to Hold the Powerful Accountable?   |  |  |
|----------------------------|---|--|--|
|                            | Those Affected by Their<br>Actions—Participation  | Those Entrusting Them with Powers-<br>Delegation   |  |
| Instrumental agents        | Ia. " <b>Direct democracy</b> ": Actions of power-wielders are what those affected (the people) instructed them to do in this contingency.                        | Ila. <b>Principal–Agent:</b> Power-wielders act as faithful agents of principals who empower them. |  |
| Discretionary authorities  | Ib. <b>Populist:</b> Policies followed by the power-wielders lead to outcomes approved by those affected, which leads those affected to confer additional powers. | IIb. <b>Trustee:</b> Power-wielders perform the duties of their offices faithfully.                |  |

| Mechanism            | Accountability Holder                         | Power-Wielder                    | Cost to Power-Wielder  | Example   |
|----------------------|---|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Hierarchical         | Leaders of<br>organization                    | Subordinate official             | Loss of career<br>opportunities                                | Authority of UN<br>Secretary-General  |
| Supervisory          | States  | Multilateral organization and    | Restraints on ability to act, loss of office                   | World Bank and<br>IMF governance<br>by their executive<br>boards  |
| Fiscal               | Funding agencies                              | Funded agency                    | Budget restrictions  | Withholding of UN dues  |
|                      |   |                                  |  | its executive head  |
| Legal                | Courts  | Individual official or<br>agency | From restriction of<br>authority to criminal<br>penalties      | International<br>Criminal Court   |
| Market               | Equity- and bond-<br>holders and<br>consumers | Firm                             | Loss of access to, or<br>higher cost of,<br>capital            | Refusal of capital<br>markets to finance<br>developing country<br>governments<br>during world<br>financial crises |
| Peer                 | Peer organizations                            | Organizations and their leaders  | Effects on network ties<br>and therefore on<br>others' support | Independent<br>marine certification<br>body's evaluation<br>of the<br>Greenpeace-Shell<br>controversy             |
| Public reputationala | Peers and diffuse public                      | Individual or agency             | Diffuse effects on<br>reputation, prestige,<br>self-esteem     | Effects on U.S.<br>"soft power" of<br>unilateralism   |

a Reputational effects are involved in all issues of accountability, as mechanisms leading to punishment through hierarchy, supervision, fiscal measures, legal action, the market, and peer responses. The category of public reputational effects refers to situations where the other means of accountability are not available, but reputational effects are widely known and significant.

| TABLE 3. Power Wielders and Constraints   Relevant International and Transnational Accountability   Power-Wielder Mechanisms   Strength of Constraints |   |   |  |  |
|--|---|---|--|--|
|  |   |   |  |  |
| NGOs   | Mostly participatory: Peer,<br>reputational, market   | Strong when NGO is weak;<br>weaker when NGO is strong   |  |  |
| Transgovernmental networks   | Mostly participatory: Peer  | Quite weak; more a matter of<br>negotiation constraints   |  |  |
| Firms  | Mostly participatory: Market,<br>reputational   | Stronger for brand-name firms in<br>consumer markets and media<br>firms than for more anonymous<br>firms  |  |  |
| States   | External accountability mostly<br>participatory: Peer, reputational<br>Delegated accountability<br>(supervisory and fiscal) only for<br>weak, dependent states who have<br>accepted supervision as a<br>condition for support | Varies with state power and degree<br>of interdependence. For relatively<br>powerful states, negotiation<br>constraints are more important<br>than accountability mechanisms. |  |  |