Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace Operations

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In his address to the UN General Assembly in September 1999, Kofi Annan insisted that 'state sovereignty ... is being redefined by the forces of globalisation and international cooperation. These developments demand of us a willingness to think anew about how the United Nations responds to the political, human rights and humanitarian crises affecting so much of the world'.[1] International responses to these challenges have varied. The Canadian government, for example, has spoken at length about 'human security' and supported an international commission to develop a more reconciliatory approach to the relationship between sovereignty and human rights.[2] In Britain, the then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, proposed a set of criteria to guide future humanitarian interventions.[3] The Secretary-General himself commissioned the so-called Brahimi Report. This was to conduct a thorough investigation of past and current peace operations, question the conceptual assumptions behind them and suggest how the UN Secretariat and its decision-making bodies might improve their responses to political and human rights crises.

The Brahimi Report was officially launched at the UN's Millennium Summit in September 2000. Far from challenging first principles, however, the Report focused upon how the UN Secretariat's staff working on peacekeeping might better manage personnel in the field to produce more effective results.[4] To promote better management of peace operations the Report made four major recommendations:

- The military component of a peace operation should be robust enough to defend itself effectively and protect civilians under its care.
- There should be greater consultation between the Security Council and troop contributing countries.
- The Security Council should not authorize a mission until it has the means to accomplish its goals.
- The planning and management of peace operations should be reorganized to improve coordination and personnel should be recruited on the basis of expertise.[5]

After a generally favourable international reception, the Report's critics have grown, and at the time of writing its recommendations and reforms have yet to be tested in the crucible of establishing and running a new peace operation. India and Kenya, for example, have publicly disputed the idea that forces deployed on peace operations should be 'robust'.[6] Moreover, the practical experiences of post-Brahimi peace-keeping in Eritrea-Ethiopia (UNMEE), the ongoing operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the mission supporting West African peacekeepers and French troops in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) have not reflected the emergence of a new paradigm of peace operations. These missions have been guided by traditional defi-nitions of consent, impartiality and minimum force and have been beset with the familiar problems of under-resourcing and lack of political vision, most notably in the case of MONUC.

Conceptually, the Brahimi Report stopped short of fully 'thinking anew' about how peace operations ought to respond to political crises in at least two important respects. First, as with the Canadian and British initiatives, Brahimi's panel failed to interrogate the roles peace operations play in wider processes of global politics. All three approaches assume a consensus exists on what constitutes a crisis, the elements of the solution, and the most appropriate strategies to achieve it. They therefore represent a managerialist or 'problem solving' approach to improving peace operations that does not funda-mentally address structural issues but instead attempts to deal with par-ticular sources of trouble within contemporary political structures.[7] Instead, we argue that 'thinking anew' should begin by critically evaluating the purposes of peace operations and providing alternative visions of their function in global politics.

Second, these initiatives do not appear to reflect very deeply upon what 'thinking anew' might mean. In our opinion, thinking anew requires an engagement with the dominant philosophical assumptions of the day relevant to the topic under consideration. This, in turn, throws up at least two challenges: one epistemological and the other ontological.[8] The epistemological challenge involves addressing ques-tions such as: What constitutes valid knowledge about contemporary conflict, human suffering and global responses? How is 'common sense' constructed and which type of knowledge and whose experi-ences are privileged, and with what effects? The ontological challenge raises questions about the nature of the crises that stimulate an inter-national desire to respond, the relationship between global structures of insecurity and individual actors, and the relationship between 'us' and 'them'.

What Are Peace Operations for?

There has been surprisingly little work on the broader relationship between peacekeeping and global politics. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify two broad and competing images of the liberal democratic peace thesis that underpin ideas about what role peace operations should play in global politics. Elsewhere we have labelled these 'Westphalian' and 'post-Westphalian' conceptions of what peacekeeping is for.[9] In its Westphalian form, the commitment to liberalism and democracy that lies at the heart of the democratic peace thesis was tempered by a concern to maintain the internal integrity and political independence of sovereign states. In the Versailles and Dumbarton Oaks negotiations that paved the way for the League of Nations Covenant and the UN Charter respectively, the desire to spread peace through liberal democracy took place in a context where sovereign independence and imperial concerns took precedence over concerns about a state's internal political organization.[10] This Westphalian logic suggested that although a world full of liberal democratic states was unrealistic, international diplomacy at least should be conducted in a liberal fashion: war should be renounced as an instrument of policy; there should be open diplomacy, an end to secret alliances, a space for rational discussion and a forum for international arbitration, should potential belligerents desire it. If, as many suspected, states became less liberal and democratic as they prepared for war, the provision of institutions and political spaces for the peaceful resolution of inter-state conflict would in the short term reduce the number of wars and in the long term, by facilitating conditions for the creation of more liberal democratic states, encourage stable peace to develop. From the 1950s, the UN's practical application of this Westphalian approach to conflict management was usually known as traditional peacekeeping.

Traditional conceptions of peacekeeping are premised on the so-called 'holy trinity' of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force. Their principal purpose is to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution efforts by the parties themselves.[11] Traditional peacekeeping tends to take place in the period of a conflict between a ceasefire and a political settlement. It aims to facilitate conflict resolution by creating a degree of confidence between belligerents that opens up a space for political dialogue. As such, it is predicated on three key assumptions about the belligerents: they are states with Clausewitzian, hierarchical militaries that wish to end the conflict and welcome outside conflict resolution initiatives.

Traditional peacekeeping was a product of the Cold War. Not surprisingly therefore, the end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal ideas

over communism increasingly challenged the basic assumptions under-pinning this approach.[12] First, since well before the Cold War ended, Clausewitzian warfare between states has dramatically declined.[13] Second, although the number of intra-state conflicts has also steadily declined since the end of the Cold War, Western governments, aid agencies, non-governmental organizations and international organiz-ations have become increasingly involved in violent conflicts in many parts of the world. Many state leaders have argued that just as liberalism and democracy brought peace and prosperity to the West, so the pro-motion of democracy and market economics through aid conditionality and the so-called 'new aid paradigm'[14] would be the best way to bring stable peace to areas of instability. These developments resulted in the gradual emergence of a new approach to peace operations, which we describe as 'post-Westphalian'.

Primarily sponsored by Western states, the post-Westphalian con-ception was nicely summarized by Kofi Annan's predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. 'Democratic institutions and processes within states', Boutros-Ghali argued,

> may . . . be conducive to peace among states. The accountability and transparency of democratic governments to their own citizens, who understandably may be highly cautious about war as it is they who will have to bear its risks and burdens, may help to restrain recourse to military conflict with other states. The legitimacy conferred upon democratically elected governments commands the respect of peoples of other democratic states and fosters expectations of negotiation, compromise and the rule of law.[15]

Similarly, former US President Clinton insisted that 'democracies don't attack each other'. Consequently, 'the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy everywhere'.[16]

The post-Westphalian conception, therefore, insists that in the long term the best chance for stable peace to take root in international society will be if all its members are liberal democracies. According to this approach, liberal democratic states construct relationships built on confident expectations of peaceful change, free trade, cooperation for mutual gain and transnational relationships between societies. It also implies that where liberal societies are absent, war within and between states will be more likely. The principal aim of peace operations thus becomes not so much about creating spaces for negotiated conflict resolution between states but about actively contributing to the construction of liberal polities, economies and societies. In other words,

post-Westphalian peace operations are intended to protect and spread liberal democratic governance.

Although what Michael Pugh describes in his contribution as the 'New York orthodoxy' has developed around the post-Westphalian approach to peace operations its implementation has been inconsistent and selective, for two principal reasons. First, constructing liberal democracies is a contested, expensive and prolonged activity. After 'discovering' this in post-war Germany and Japan and more recently in Bosnia and Kosovo, Western states have been reluctant to commit themselves to similar projects in places like East Timor and Afghanistan. Instead, in most parts of the world aid remains conditional upon the pursuit of liberal democracy, neo-liberal economic policies and 'good governance' (as defined by the international financial institutions). This has had many negative social and political consequences from sub-Saharan Africa to Latin America.[17] Second, there is no consistent consensus in the Security Council that this is what the UN ought to be doing.

There is thus an ongoing debate about what peace operations should be for. Representatives of China, India, Kenya and many other states insist that the Westphalian conception should continue to predominate. For example, since it first participated in a vote on peacekeeping in 1981, the Chinese government has consistently argued that several factors are necessary to gain its support for peace operations: host nation acquiescence; Security Council approval; the achievement of a political settlement before sending troops; the UN should avoid becoming a party to the dispute; and only a minimum level of force should be used.[18]

Similarly, in the most recent UN-authorized peace operations in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Afghanistan (ISAF), and Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), it is possible to discern a 'return' to more traditional precepts.[19] States such as China and their supporters argue that stable peace can only be built on the basis of a pluralist international society that respects the sanctity of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference.[20] Many Western leaders and thinkers disagree. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, famously argued that state sovereignty should no longer be allowed to protect states that abuse the human rights of their citizens.[21] According to this post-Westphalian conception, wherever possible the UN and regional organizations should support, foster and even enforce the creation of liberal democracies as the best route to stable peace.

The first challenge of 'thinking anew' about peace operations is thus to recognize that the purpose of such operations is contested and far from self-evident. Consequently, these disagreements need to be aired

and their implications explored more closely. In order to do this, however, we need to engage with the philosophy underpinning contemporary peace operations.

Thinking Anew: Why Epistemology and Ontology Matter

The challenge to 'think anew' about peace operations raises fundamental epistemological and ontological issues. In 1981, Robert Cox argued that knowledge is never politically neutral: it 'is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose. All theories have a perspective.'[22] Knowledge can thus serve two distinct purposes: it can act as a guide to help solve problems that arise within a particular perspective, or it can reflect upon the process of theorizing itself and enquire into how it relates to other perspectives. From the first purpose emerges 'problem solving' theory, from the second, 'critical' theory.[23]

Problem solving theory takes the world as it finds it and aims to make the relationships and institutions found therein work smoothly by dealing with particular sources of trouble. As we discuss in greater detail in the concluding essay, such theories are far from socially or politically redundant but must be seen as limited in their perspective and as identifying and dealing with problems in a particular manner. In this collection, several contributors argue that the theory and practice of peace operations and conflict resolution have been shaped by a problem-solving epistemology. This has resulted in managerialist solutions based upon the prevailing definitions of common sense that privilege particular types of knowledge and experiences as relevant, and draw spatial and temporal limits around the remit of peace operations. Although such approaches may mitigate particular violent conflicts they do not challenge or seriously reflect upon the global structures that contribute to human suffering and, sometimes, violent conflict in the first place. Moreover, problem-solving approaches define certain forms of action as relevant, identify particular lines of causality and render certain practices legitimate at the expense of others.

Critical theory on the other hand aims to reflect upon the characteristics and structures of the prevailing world order and asks how that order came about. Critical knowledge calls into question existing institutions and social power relations by enquiring into their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing. In relation to peace operations, a critical approach seeks to investigate who benefits from certain types of practices, what linkages exist between local actors and global structures, and why certain voices and experiences are marginalized in policy debates.[24] But critical theory is not solely concerned with developing critiques of past and present thought and action. It is also

fundamentally concerned with proposing reconstructive agendas based on possibilities immanent within the current global order. The first step in any reconstructive agenda, however, is to challenge prevailing conceptions of common sense and listen to what Edward Said called 'the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless'.[25] Reflecting upon the epistemological assumptions behind current peace operations is thus a necessary part of thinking anew.

The second set of challenges concerns ontological issues. What are the entities that make up global politics? Or, more specifically here, what are the relevant entities when discussing peace operations and how should we understand the environment in which they take place? All theories make ontological assumptions about what the world is like, including theories of peace operations. Sometimes, ontological assumptions are made explicit. In International Relations, for example, neo-realists explicitly focus on states competing in an anarchic international system, Marxists focus upon class relations and structures of capitalism, and feminists concentrate upon gender relations and patriarchal structures. The ontology behind the theories of peace operations, however, is rarely, if ever, discussed. In our opinion it needs to be, because as Scott Burchill put it, 'we cannot define a problem in world politics without presupposing a basic structure consisting of certain kinds of entities involved and the form of significant relationships between them'.[26]

Thinking about the ontology of peace operations requires an engagement with three types of interrelated questions: what is the relationship between the intervener and the recipient of intervention? What is the ideational and material context in which peace operations function? And, what counts as an issue in the study and practice of peace operations?

In his contribution to this collection, Alex Bellamy argues that problem-solving and critical theories are based on different understandings of the relationship between the intervener and the recipient of intervention. Problem-solving theories treat the recipient of intervention as an object, the context as a pre-given environment that exists outside the intervener's own understanding of it, and the intervention as a discrete act with a clear beginning and end. There are three major problems with this approach.

First, the idea that intervention is a discrete act suggests that the intervening states or organizations are not already implicated in the crisis they are intervening in. However, military intervention is but one aspect of wider relations of interference in domestic societies.[27]

Second, this approach tends to emphasize the military aspects of intervention at the expense of long-term programmes aimed at sustaining economic development and genuine democratization.

Third, this approach turns subjects of security into objects who have little say about what 'being secure' might mean to them and what security policies might be most appropriate.[28] Critical theories, on the other hand, recognize that interveners and recipients are bound together by complex relationships that extend beyond the ostensible limits of the particular intervention in question. This recognition provides the impetus for thinking critically about the ideational and material context in which peace operations take place and the issues that are considered to be pertinent.

There has been a growing recognition of the significance of the global ideational and material context that peace operations take place within. In the realm of ideas, Oliver Richmond and François Debrix have pointed out that peace operations attempt to create and recreate a *particular type* of international order, while Roland Paris and Mark Duffield have shown that the type of order sustained is a distinctly liberal one.[29] The dominance of liberal ideas also contributes to the material context in which peacekeepers operate and the intellectual tools they use to understand and address the problems they confront. On one hand, the dominance of neo-liberal economic theories and the current regulation of the global economy (often along distinctly illiberal lines) has helped create particular types of war economies, political structures, 'warlordism' and 'weak' states, and relationships between those on the 'inside' of the conflict and those ostensibly 'outside'.[30] On the other hand, peacekeepers themselves are also largely constituted by other elements of this broader context: their equipment, training, mandate, worldview, operating procedures, and ethical frames are influenced by their position in the global economy and political system.

Thinking ontologically about peace operations also challenges us to think about what counts as an issue worthy of response and why. In general, conceptual approaches to peace operations have been temporally limited to the period in which the intervention is taking place and the issues that have apparently confronted the peacekeepers. This again reflects the idea, central to problem-solving theories, that the issues exist 'out there' and simply present themselves to peacekeepers. By contrast, critical approaches insist that issues do not exist independently of the person or collectivities perceiving them. Issues are constructed, not discovered, and the relative significance attached to particular issues is shaped by factors such as ideology, material circumstances, epistemological assumptions and geographical location. To take one example, until very recently the idea that peace operations may be shaped by particular understandings of gender, may help reinforce particular gender roles, or that such operations may have different consequences for different genders, has been all but ignored as an irrelevance.[31]

Peace Operations and Global Order

The challenge to 'think anew' about peace operations therefore presents several important but under-explored questions about what peace operations are for, how we decide to evaluate them and what issues we think are important. This collection seeks to address some of these questions first by addressing the conceptual and theoretical issues discussed above and then by considering some empirical cases. All the contributors problematize the assumptions underpinning contemporary peace operations in one way or another and discuss some of the immanent possibilities for reform. In order to address these issues the study proceeds in two parts. Part I addresses in more detail many of the conceptual issues raised in this introduction. In Part II the contributors analyse a variety of topics to explore what 'thinking anew' about peace operations might mean in practice.

In the opening contribution, Alex J. Bellamy explores contending approaches to the theory of peace operations. Following on from the idea of 'problem-solving' and 'critical' theories, a theme developed further by Michael Pugh, Bellamy identifies three key issues that divide the two approaches: the purpose of theorizing, how to understand the social world, and the relationship between theory and practice. Bellamy argues that in all three areas 'problem solving' theories perform important functions but limit our understanding of peace operations in important ways. For example, 'problem solving' theories do not reflect on the ideological values that they, and the practices they examine, are supporting. As a result, they have proved unable to satisfactorily explain or understand political practices in complex emergencies. In concluding, therefore, Bellamy calls for the development of 'critical' approaches to the subject that interrogate dominant forms of common sense about peace operations by asking whether or not they contribute to human emancipation.

The challenge to think critically about peace operations is taken up in the following three essays. Michael Pugh begins his essay by arguing that the 'received wisdom' of peacekeeping is not value neutral but serves to protect an existing international order. It does this through dominant representations and discourses of peace operations that portray soldiers as 'humanitarian' actors, impartially pursuing peace. This image, Pugh argues, is deeply problematic and hides the way in which peace operations help to fulfil the purposes of what he describes as 'the New York orthodoxy'. This involves the convergence of 'Western' and 'global' interests in the maintenance of international peace and security and the creation of regional blocs designed to police the 'liberal peace'. By

contrast, Pugh argues, this consensus reflects only one potential framework for viewing peace operations.

The two subsequent essays develop Pugh's claim that the theory and practice of peace operations are not neutral, but instead reflect particular political values. David Chandler argues that the much-heralded report by the self-styled International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect*, does not reveal the emergence of a global humanitarian conscience but instead reflects a new balance of power in the post-Cold War world. The justifications for what Noam Chomsky described as the 'new military humanism' are as dependent on *realpolitik* as the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention that preceded them.

Developing this theme, Oliver Richmond critically evaluates the ways in which dominant understandings of the concept of 'peace' currently informing peace operations are constructed so that they support the interests of the intervening powers more than the 'recipients' of intervention. With illustrations from a variety of cases including Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, Richmond describes how long-term peace has been defined as being synonymous not simply with the absence of physical violence but with the institutionalization of frameworks of liberal governance. In practice, these systems of governance have often left outsiders – in the form of liberal states, international organizations and NGOs – exercising final authority over local actors. As a result, contemporary peacebuilding operations have developed a range of uncomfortable similarities with earlier structures of Western imperialism.

The second part of the collection investigates what these insights might mean in more practical terms. The first two contributions to this section explore the impact of adopting a broader and multileveled understanding of peace operations in two key areas: the global economy and gender. Paul Williams argues that a broader understanding of peace operations and, crucially, why they are considered necessary in certain parts of the world and not others, should encourage us to address the role played by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in creating the contexts that peacekeepers are deployed into. Williams highlights several key issues that ought to frame the way we think about the relationship between the IFIs and peace operations. Most importantly, he points out that while the majority of approaches to peace operations tend to acknowledge the structural backdrop of a society of states, they seldom recognize or problematize the impact of neo-liberal capitalism in conflict zones. By detailing the role of the IFIs in two war-torn states, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Williams demonstrates the importance of understanding how the current regulation of the global economy contributes to the

problems that peacekeepers are asked to address and constrains the scope of international responses to complex emergencies.

Gender issues are another important, yet often overlooked, aspect of peace operations. With a few notable exceptions, the study of peace operations has been gender blind and, as a result, has contributed to perpetuating marginalization based on gender.[32] Although the UN has attempted to 'mainstream' gender within its discourse on peace operations, according to Tarja Värynen, it remains confined within modernist modes of thinking. This, in turn, has reproduced dichotomous and oppositional categories of masculinity and femininity in the UN's discourse on war, peace and gender. Such identities are (inadvertently) reproduced by the managerialism and rationalism that informs the discourses constructing UN peace operations. As a result Värynen suggests that no amount of 'gender mainstreaming' will adequately address these structural problems. To overcome this, Värynen calls for the breaking down of the 'binary modes of thinking' that are characteristic of modernist discourses and their replacement with a recognition that gendered identities are not prior to politics but are instead constructed through political practice.

The final two contributions assess how 'thinking anew' about peace operations in some of the ways suggested earlier can lead to the development of innovative strategies for peace – precisely the task of a critical theory of peace operations. Roland Bleiker begins by pointing to the 'impossibility' of future UN peace operations being deployed to ameliorate or resolve the Korean conflict. Having intervened on the side of the South in the 1950s, the UN cannot be seen as an impartial mediator. The problem is reinforced, Bleiker argues, by the cult of the state that pervades the Korean peninsula. The border between North and South is arguably the most hermetically sealed border in the world, and cross-border initiatives are dominated by the two states. Nevertheless, critically informed human security writers suggest that immanent possibilities for conflict resolution do exist, though not in traditional militarized international political spaces. Bleiker goes on to show how non-state interaction between North and South is growing, promoting communication, information exchange and face-to-face encounters. The significance of these still fragile processes can be gauged by the vigour with which the state, in both the North and South, has attempted to foreclose interaction – particularly at the face-to-face level. Despite this opposition, Bleiker concludes that it is these 'transversal' and informal interactions, rather than state-based solutions such as peace operations, that provide the best chance for conflict resolution on the peninsula, asking us (once again) to listen to the voices that are often excluded by the conventional theory and practice of peace operations.

Although there has been growing recognition of the importance of preventing the outbreak of violent conflict, such concerns have remained peripheral to the study of peace operations. Indeed, the two subjects have often been treated in isolation. Eli Stamnes, however, demonstrates that peacekeepers can play important roles in preventing conflict. Drawing on Axel Honneth's understanding of critical theory and the emerging literature on Critical Security Studies, Stamnes sketches a conceptual framework for evaluating both the theory and practice of peace operations. This framework searches for immanent possibilities for emancipatory politics in the discrepancies between the words and deeds of the actors concerned. Applying this framework to the UN's conflict prevention operations in Macedonia, Stamnes highlights two important points for the study of peace operations.

First, that certain non-mandated/unofficial activities conducted by peacekeepers (such as providing support to local community initiatives) are often crucially important to the local population. To date, such activities have not been included in dominant accounts of what peacekeepers do, and Stamnes calls for a reconfiguring of our 'common sense' in order to appreciate their political role and potential.

Second, that the official discourse of peace operations in Macedonia focused first and foremost on states rather than people as the ultimate referent object of security. The concomitant concern to maintain host government consent meant that the UN mission refrained from taking a position on arguably the most crucial issue in relations between the Macedonian government and the ethnic Albanian minority: the University of Tetovo. And by declining to take an explicit stance the UN in effect sided with the position of the Macedonian government.

In sum, this collection responds to Kofi Annan's call to 'think anew' about peace operations in two main ways.

First, it attempts to problematize the assumptions that underpin and inform contemporary peace operations and ask: whose interests are served by the prevailing definitions of 'common sense' in these matters? Several of the contributors point to the idea that while the dominant problem-solving approach does yield important insights about the effectiveness of particular strategies, it also helps obscure the fact that it is usually the interests, values and priorities of the interveners, not those of the victims, that shape contemporary peace operations.

Second, several contributors have discussed alternative conceptual starting points for the theory and practice of peace operations, which reflect the ontological and epistemological suggestions mentioned earlier. Alternatives included thinking about the relationship between the regulation of the global economy and peace operations; de-emphasizing

the state to help open up space for conflict resolution within civil society; and broadening our understanding of what peacekeepers 'do' to include non-mandated tasks. The challenge for future theories of peace operations is to combine theoretical insights with an analysis of empirical issues in order to develop more sophisticated understandings of what roles peace operations play in constructing the contemporary global order and what roles individual peacekeepers can undertake to help.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

NOTES

1. Kofi Annan, 'Address of the Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly', 20 September 1999 (GA/9596).
2. See Lloyd Axworthy, 'Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership', *International Journal*, Vol.52, No.2, 1997, pp.183–96; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: ICISS, 2000).
3. Robin Cook, 'Guiding Humanitarian Intervention', speech to the American Bar Association, London, 19 July 2000.
4. Christine Gray, 'Peacekeeping after the Brahimi Report: Is there a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?' *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Vol.6, No.2, 2001, p.288.
5. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809), 21 August 2000.
6. Nigel White, 'Commentary on the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (The Brahimi Report)', *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Vol.6, No.1, 2001, p.134.
7. See Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, Vol.10, No.2, 1981, pp.126–55 and Michael Pugh's contribution to this collection.
8. For a relevant discussion see Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
9. Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
10. See Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, 4th edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1984); F. P.Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952); and Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (London: Macmillan, 1945).
11. This discussion of traditional peacekeeping draws upon Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, ch.5.
12. The traditional principles of peacekeeping had been challenged since their inception, especially during the mission to the Congo in the early 1960s but the end of the Cold War increased the frequency and intensity of the challenges.

13. See Mary Kaldor, 'Introduction' in M. Kaldor and B. Vashee (eds.), *New Wars: Restructuring the Global Military Sector* (London: Pinter, 1997), pp.3–33, and John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

14. Mark Duffield, 'NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.18, No.3, 1999, pp.527–42.

15. Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the UN General Assembly, 20 December 1996 (UN Doc. A/51/761).

16. William Clinton, 'State of the Union Address', cited in *New York Times*, 26 January 1994.

17. See for example, Rita Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (London: Zed, 2000), Barry Gills et al. (eds.), *Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World* Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993); and William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

18. Bates Gill and James Reilly, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing', *Survival*, Vol.42, No.3, 2000, p.44.

19. The recent Security Council authorization given to a French-led 'coalition of the willing' to deploy to the DRC does not yet indicate a major reversal of this trend for two reasons. First, its mandate is only temporary (due to last between June and 1 September 2003). Second, it is limited to the Ituri region of the DRC.

20. For discussions of the pluralist view of international society see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977) and Robert H. Jackson, *The Global Covenant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

21. Tony Blair, 'Doctrine of the International Community', speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, Chicago, 22 April 1999.

22. Cox, 'social Forces', p.128.

23. These ideas are developed in the chapters by Alex J. Bellamy, Michael Pugh, Paul Williams, Roland Bleiker and Eli Stamnes.

24. Some work has already been done in this vein. See for example, Roland Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism', *International Security*, Vol.22, No.2, 1997, pp.54–89 and 'International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.28, No.4, 2002, pp.637–56.

25. Edward Said, *Representations of the Intellectual* (London: Vintage, 1994), p.84.

26. Scott Burchill, 'Introduction' in Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater et al. *Theories of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1995), p.17.

27. See Alex J. Bellamy, 'Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.29, No.2, 2003, pp.321–40, and Paul Williams, 'Indifference and Intervention: International Society and Human Rights in Africa', *International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol.5, No.1, 2001, pp.140–53.

28. This idea was conveyed to the authors in relation to the concept of human security by Roland Bleiker. See Roland Bleiker, 'From State to Human Security: Reflections on Inter-Korean Relations', *KNDU Review: A Journal of Military Affairs* (Korea), Vol.7, No.2, 2002. As Rob Walker put it: 'Modern accounts of security are precisely about subjectivity, subjection and the conditions under which we have been constructed as subjects subject to subjection'. R.B.J. Walker, 'The Subject of Security', in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997), p.71.

29. Oliver Richmond, 'A Genealogy of Peacemaking: The Creation and Re-Creation of Order', *Alternatives*, Vol.26, No.2, 2001, p.317; François Debrix, *Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Security and Development* (London: Zed, 2001); Paris, 'Peacebuilding' and 'International Peacebuilding' (see note 24).

30. See Paul Williams' contribution to this collection.
31. Exceptions include UN, *Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations* (UN: Lessons Learned Unit, DPKO, July 2000); Louise Olsson, *Gendering UN Peacekeeping: Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective on Multidimensional Peace Operations* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 2001); Cynthia Cockburn and Dubravka Zarkov (eds.), *The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2002) and Sandra Whitworth, 'The Practice, and Praxis, of Feminist Research in International Relations' in Richard Wyn Jones (ed.), *Critical Theory and World Politics* (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp.149–60.
32. See note 31.